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REGINA v. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
THE HOME DEPARTMENT EX PARTE
BRIND: UNCONVENTIONAL
INTRUSIONS ON FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION*
"[Censorship] will be primely to the discouragement of all
learning, and the stop of [t]ruth."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The frequent denial of freedom of expression2 in much of
the world beyond Western Europe and North America has made
protection of freedom of the media a significant characteristic of
democratic societies.3 The United Kingdom, historically a pio-
neer in the realm of individual rights, has traditionally focused
its efforts on expanding the protection of civil liberties.4 How-
* Thanks to Ms. Margaret Gale and Ms. Irene Romanelli, Esq.
1. J. MILTON, AREOPAGrrICA 4 (Everymans ed. 1927).
2. The relatively modem concept of freedom of expression is a product of the post-
World War 11 revival of natural rights. McGregor, Freedom of Expression and Informa-
tion: Conditions, Restrictions, and Limitations Deriving from the Requirements of De-
mocracy, 6 HUM. RTS. L.J. 384, 389 (1985) (report presented to the Sixth International
Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention), held in 1985
at Seville, Spain) [hereinafter McGregor]. The brutal disregard of individual rights by
certain European regimes earlier in this century prompted a reassessment of the prevail-
ing utilitarian philosophy, which permitted the sacrifice of individual rights for the
greater good of others. Id. The advent of The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950, Council of Europe,
Europ. T.S. No.5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Human Rights Convention], meant that
for the first time in history, treatment of citizens by a sovereign state was no longer a
matter for the state's own exclusive determination, but a matter of legitimate concern for
all other states and their inhabitants. See McGregor, supra, at 389. See infra notes 20-33
and accompanying text.
3. See McGregor, supra note 2, at 397.
4. See UNITED KINGDOM FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFIcE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM 1 (1988) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS]. The Magna Carta of 1215
declared that no man should be punished except by the judgment of his peers and by the
law of the land, and that to none should justice be denied. The Bill of Rights 1689,
though concerned mainly with Parliament, outlawed royal authoritarianism, guaranteed
free elections to Parliament and free speech within Parliament, prohibited cruel and un-
usual punishment, and guaranteed a host of other rights. E. WADE & G. PHILLrPS, CON-
sTITUTIONAL AND AuCNISTRATIWE LAW 13-15 (1985) [hereinafter E. WADE & G. PHILIPs].
The United Kingdom is also bound by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/1810 (1948), and the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), both
of which protect freedom of expression.
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ever, the United Kingdom's recent directive (directive, ban, or
restrictions) 5 aimed at restricting access by the media to certain
extremist groups in Northern Ireland6 has seriously infringed
upon the right to freedom of expression of both the British
7
public and British media.' The ban prohibits the direct appear-
5. See Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op.
at 1 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file). See also infra
note 101.
6. Beginning in the sixteenth century, Protestant settlers from Great Britain infil-
trated Ulster, a militantly Catholic province in Northern Ireland, so that a part'of Ulster
attained a Protestant majority. UNITED KINGDOM FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
NORTHERN IRELAND 1 (1988) [hereinafter NORTHERN IRELAND]. While the Protestants, or
Unionists, favored union with Great Britain, the Catholic majority in Ireland developed
a nationalist tradition and moved increasingly towards independence. Id.; W. HELLER-
STEIN, R. McKAY & P. SCHLAM, CRmMNAL JusTIcE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRE-
LAND, 43 REC. A. B. CITY N.Y. 110, 117 (1988) [hereinafter W. HELLERSTEIN, R. McKAY &
P. ScHLAm]. While the greater part of Ireland achieved full independence in 1949 as the
Republic of Ireland, six counties in Ulster became Northern Ireland, a constituent of the
United Kingdom. NORTHERN IRELAND, supra, at 2. In the United Kingdom House of
Commons 17 of the 650 seats are allotted to Northern Ireland. Out of those 17 seats, 3
are held by the nationalist Social Democratic and Labor party. Id. at 15. In 1983 Provi-
sional Sinn Fein candidate Gerry Adams won the seat for West Belfast, but he has not
taken his seat. W. FLACKEs, NORTHERN IRELAND: A POLITICAL DIRECTORY 1968-83, at 29
(1983) [hereinafter W. FLACKES]. Sinn Fein means "Ourselves Alone" in Gaelic, the na-
tive language of Ireland. W. HELLERSTEIN, R. McKAY & P. ScHLAM, supra, at 119. The
remaining 13 seats are presently held by Unionists. NORTHERN IRELAND, supra, at 15.
Throughout this Comment, nationalist refers to the Catholic minority of Northern Ire-
land, while unionist refers to the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland. The popula-
tion of Northern Ireland is divided: just under two-thirds is Protestant, while the re-
mainder is Roman Catholic. The latter predominantly favors political union with
Ireland. STANDING ADvIsoRY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1977, CMND. SFE. 4, No. 7009, at 4. From 1969 to 1988 a
total of 2,709 people, including 1,864 civilians, have died as a result of terrorism in
Northern Ireland. NORTHERN IRELAND, supra, at 3. The British Government, meanwhile,
has reacted with a series of domestic measures aimed at combatting terrorism. HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 12.
7. In this Comment, the term "British" will refer to all parts of the United King-
dom, which includes England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
8. This Comment is limited to the analysis of freedom of expression with respect to
the British media and public, and in no way examines the right to political expression.
Free expression of ideas and information advocating or furthering terrorism is almost
certain to trigger permissible restrictions on the freedom of expression. For an in-depth
treatment of the use of media by terrorists, and the advantages terrorists gain thereby,
see A. SCHMID & J. DE GRAAF, VIOLENCE AS COMMUNICATION: INSURGENT TERRORISM AND
THE WESTERN NEWS MEDIA (1982) [hereinafter A. SCHMID & J. DE GRAAvJ. Indeed, the
European Commission on Human Rights (Commission) has already upheld interference
with the right to freedom of expression based on the content of certain letters of an Irish
Republican Army (IRA) sympathizer. See X v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 62
(decisions & reports) (1976) (holding that conviction of applicant under the Incitement
to Disaffection Act of 1934 was permissible since the letters in his'possession encouraged
British soldiers to turn their guns on superiors and offered them money to act illegally).
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ance on television or radio of several extremist groups from
Northern Ireland, and any spoken words that tend to advance
their causes.9
Reporting the news from Northern Ireland has always been
a difficult and unenviable task for the media. 10 In Regina v. Sec-
retary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind,1' the
Queen's Bench divisional court (divisional court) upheld the
British Government's restrictions against a challenge by a group
of journalists on the ground that the Secretary of State for the
Home Department had the proper power to issue the restric-
tions. 2 This Comment discusses that decision in light of free-
dom of expression as protected by article ten of the European
Convention on Human Rights (Convention), to which the
United Kingdom is a signatory.'3 This Comment criticizes the
Similarly, in Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 5 (decisions & re-
ports) (1980), a prosecution under the same act was upheld in the interest of preventing
disorder within the army. Id. However, censorship of expression advocating terrorism is
quite different from censorship of all expression by extremist groups. See infra notes 29-
31 and accompanying text.
9. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind, C0/1756/88, slip
op. at I (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file), 139 NEw L.J.
1229 (1989) (per Watkins, L.J., joined by Roch & Judge, JJ.), aff'd on other grounds,
[1990] 2 W.L.R. 787 (C.A. 1989) (opinions per Donaldson, M.R., & Gibson & McCowan,
L.JJ.), af'd sub nom. Brind v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, [1991] 1 All E.R.
720 (H.L.). For the full text of the ban, see infra note 101.
10. CO/1756/88, slip op. at 6 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library,
cases file); 138 PARL. Dam., H.C. (6th ser.) 894 (1988). See also Birt, Gagging the Messen-
ger, The Independent, Nov. 21, 1988, at 21, col. 1 [hereinafter Birt] (recounting the diffi-
culties encountered, and the responsibilities previously exercised, by journalists in
Northern Ireland).
11. C0/1756/88, (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file),
139 Naw L.J. 1229 (1989) (per Watkins, L.J., joined by Roch & Judge, JJ.), aff'd on
other grounds, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 787 (C.A. 1989) (opinions per Donaldson, M.R., & Gibson
& McCowan, L.JJ.). In England, the high court of justice (Queen or King's Bench) is a
court of the first instance. Appeals are taken to the court of appeal, and ultimately, to
the House of Lords. Issues involving the European Convention on Human Rights may be
further appealed to the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg, France (Euro-
pean Court). Additionally, opinions issued by British courts (where more than one judge
sits) are frequently seriatim, so that decisions by such courts cannot be referred to
strictly as majority opinions.
12. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
13. Article 10 of the Convention states that:
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Arti-
cle shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, televi-
sion or cinema enterprises.
(2) The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsi-
bilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
decision as violative of the Convention since it does not permit
restrictions on expression that impose a burden disproportionate
to their anticipated benefit.14 Finally, this Comment concludes
that the court's decision, deeming the restrictions permissible
under the Convention, typifies the British judiciary's growing
carelessness about the principles that should govern all limita-
tions on freedom of expression and the judiciary's failure to de-
fer to the specific interests that require restrictions.
15
The United Kingdom has no bill of rights. Thus, British do-
mestic law offers human rights little more than procedural pro-
tections that deny relief to aggrieved plaintiffs unless an other-
wise legal decision verges on absurdity."l This Comment
concludes that while the Convention may not impose duties and
confer rights upon individuals until it is incorporated into do-
mestic law,17 the divisional court's standard of review is inconsis-
tent with the United Kingdom's obligation under the Conven-
tion to insure that its domestic law provides adequate protection
of freedom of expression.' 8 Consequently, upholding the restric-
tions is antagonistic to notions of a pluralistic, democratic
society.'9
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Article Ten
The substantive right to freedom of expression as set forth
in article ten of the Convention ° includes a group of distinct
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the inter-
ests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the preven-
tion of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protec-
tion of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and im-
partiality of the judiciary.
Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10.
14. See infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
15. JUSTICE: THE BRITISH SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE LAW 1, 4, 7 (1990).
16. See Regina v. Secretary of State for the Env't ex parte Nottinghamshire County
Council, [1986] 1 A.C. 240 (per Lord Scarman).
17. See Drzemczewski, British Courts and the European Human Rights Conven-
tion: An Unsatisfactory Situation, 1979 TOPICAL L. 38, 40 [hereinafter Drzemczewski].
18. See infra notes 20, 68 and accompanying text.
19. See Regina v. Lemon, 1979 A.C. 617, 665 (per Lord Scarman).
20. After World War H, a European Congress, made up of members of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Movements for European Unity, met at the Hague and, under
[Vol. XVII:
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rights.21 The freedom to hold opinions is primarily an individual
right.22 The freedom to receive and impart ideas and informa-
tion extends to all forms of external expression. 23 Generally, ar-
ticle ten prohibits any censorship of the press, television, radio,
or any other vehicle for the expression of ideas and informa-
the leadership of Winston Churchill, called for the foundation of the Council of Europe.
P. vAN DLJK & G. VAN HOOT, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HuMAN RIGHTS 1 (1984) [hereinafter P. VAN DmK & G. VAN HOoT]; R. BEDDARD, HuMAN
RIGHTS IN EUROPE 17, 28 (1980) [hereinafter R. BEDDARD]. The Statute of the Council of
Europe was signed by 10 nations in London on May 5, 1949. R. BEDDARD, supra, at 18.
The aim of the Council of Europe is "to achieve greater unity between its members...
by agreements and common action ... in the maintenance and further realization of
human rights and fundamental freedoms." Statute of the Council of Europe, Ch. I, art. I
(a & b), reprinted in A. ROBERTSON, THE COUNCIL O1 EUROPE 257 (1961). The Statute of
the Council of Europe created the Consultative Assembly, which then created a special
commission to prepare the Convention. P. vAN DIrK & G. VAN HooT, supra, at 1-2. The
Consultative Assembly, now known as the Parliamentary Assembly (Assembly), is com-
posed of parliamentarians of the member states. R. BEDDARD, supra, at 18. The Assem-
bly has no powers of decision but makes recommendations to the Committee of Minis-
ters. In turn, the Committee of Ministers, an executive organ, acts on the
recommendations as it thinks proper. A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 10-11
(1963). The Convention was signed in Rome on November 4, 1950 and entered into force
on September 3, 1953. A. DRZEMcZEWSKI, EUROPEAN CONVmmoN IN DOMSTIC LAw 1
(1983) [hereinafter A. DRZEMCZEWSKI]. The preamble of the Convention states that it is
designed to take the first steps towards collective enforcement of certain rights set forth
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2,
preamble. The Convention establishes a Commission on Human Rights and a Court of
Human Rights to ensure observance by parties to the Convention of the rights guaran-
teed therein. Id. at art. 19.
21. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art 10.
22. Tajima, Protection of Freedom of Expression by the European Convention, 2
HUM. RTs. J. 658, 663 (1969) [hereinafter Tajima]. The freedom to hold opinions does
not include the right to incite particular conduct or to undermine rights guaranteed else-
where in the Convention. Malinverni, Freedom of Information in the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
4 HUM. RTS. L.J. 443, 445 (1983) [hereinafter Malinverni].
23. Bullinger, Freedom of Expression and Information: An Essential Element of
Democracy, 6 HUM RTs. L.J. 338, 340 (1985) [hereinafter Bullinger] (report presented to
the Sixth International Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights,
held in 1985 at Seville, Spain). This right includes freedom to disseminate information
and ideas by access to mass media and by personal means. "Freedom of expression is
guaranteed regardless of its content." Id. at 347. The freedom to impart information
concerns mainly the content of the information, not the means by which it is imparted.
P. VAN DrnK & G. VAN HOOT, supra note 20, at 311. The right to obtain information
concerns the active pursuit of such knowledge as is necessary for independent opinion
formation. In contrast, the right to receive information freely concerns the right to gain
passively such knowledge as is necessary for independent opinion formation. Council of
Europe, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL COLLOQUY ABOUT THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 123 (1976) [hereinafter COLLOQUY]. Finally, the right to
receive information assumes that someone is willing to impart that information. Leander
v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1987).
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tion.24 Article ten also guarantees the right of the public to be
properly informed.25 These rights are guaranteed against any in-
terference by public authority, whether legislative, administra-
tive, or judicial. 6
The first inquiry under article ten is whether the right of
free expression has been violated. If a violation is found, the
next issue is whether the restriction is permissible. Freedom of
expression may be restricted pursuant to the conditions listed in
section two of article ten.2  These include restrictions in the in-
terest of public safety, for the prevention of disorder2 9  or
crime,30 and for the protection of the rights of others.3 1 These
24. See F. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 151 (1975). Justice
Black expressed a similar view with respect to the First Amendment when he stated
that-
[i]deas and beliefs are today chiefly disseminated to the masses of people
through the press, radio, [and] moving pictures. . . . The basic premise of the
First Amendment is that all present instruments of communication, as well as
others that inventive genius may bring into being, shall be free from govern-
mental censorship or prohibition.
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting). The general language of
article 10 is understood to include all technical means of communication. Bullinger,
supra note 23, at 349. The Commission recently held that freedom of expression includes
the freedom to impart information and ideas "also by means of radio broadcasts." Radio
X v. Switzerland, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 236, 239 (decisions & reports) (1984). Television
and radio program data are generally included in the information aspect of article 10,
rather than as opinions or ideas. Z. NEDJATI, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CON-
VENTION 181 (1980).
25. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40-41 (1979).
26. See Tajima, supra note 22, at 665; STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1977, CMND. SER. 4,
No. 7009, at 69.
27. See P. VAN DIJK & G. VAN HoOT, supra note 20, at 428.
28. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10, § 2; see also supra note
13.
29. In one of the leading cases interpreting the phrase "in the interests of public
safety, for the prevention of disorder," the Commission held that a narrowly tailored ban
on public demonstrations in a busy thoroughfare in the town of Moutier, Switzerland
was justifiable for the prevention of breach of the peace and serious clashes between
demonstrators. Rassemblement Jurassien & Unit6 Jurassienne v. Switzerland, 17 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 93 (decisions & reports) (1980).
30. With respect to the phrase "for the prevention of crime," the Commission has
also held that article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to respect for fam-
ily and private life, was not violated by compilation by the Vienna police of an extensive
file on the unsuccessful applicant's private life. While there was no finding of any secret
surveillance by the security police, the Commission stressed that the sole use of data in a
criminal proceeding against the applicant is justified and necessary in a democratic soci-
ety for the prevention of crime. X v. Austria, 16 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 145 (decisions &
reports) (1979). See also Baader, Meins, Meinhof & Grundman v. Federal Republic of
Germany, 2 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 58 (decisions & reports) (1975) (holding that restrictions
on correspondence, visitation and access to literature imposed upon imprisoned or de-
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exceptions must be narrowly interpreted since it is the right to
free expression that is guaranteed by the Convention, not the
exceptions.32 In sum, any restrictions on freedom of expression
must not only be prescribed by law, but must also be necessary
in a democratic society and justified by one of the exceptions
described in section two of article ten. 3
B. Interpretation of Freedom of Expression by the European
Court
In interpreting the Convention, it is the obligation of the
various judicial bodies that handle complaints3 4 to develop a
common European standard of constitutional principles to real-
ize the aims and ideals of the Council of Europe.3 5 The provi-
sions of the Convention thus become part of a new law for all
signatory states, rooted in a foundation of legal conceptions
shared by those states. 6
The requirement in article ten that a restriction on freedom
tained terrorists were necessary for the prevention of crime or disorder).
31. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10, § 2; see also supra note 13.
The phrases "public safety" and "prevention of disorder" are said to refer to the security
or order dealt with by police regulations or criminal law. Schwartz, Broadcasting and the
EEC Treaty, 11 EuR. L. Rav. 7, 53 (1986) [hereinafter Schwartz]. Recently, the House of
Lords interpreted the phrase "prevention of crime" in a broad general sense, rejecting
the notion that it addressed itself to particular identifiable future crime. In re An In-
quiry Under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, [1988] 1 A.C. 660, 704-
05 (1987) (per Lord Griffiths). Many cases before the Commission have upheld restric-
tions on freedom of expression where the views of individuals directly advocated illegal
acts or extremist ideas such as neonazism or fascism. See, e.g., X v. Austria, 42 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. 105 (1973) (prosecution of an alleged terrorist for having approved illegal
acts in an interview in the press upheld as a valid interference with freedom of expres-
sion in the interests of national security, public safety, and the prevention of disorder or
crime); X v. Austria, 1963 Y.B. EuR. CONY. ON HUM. RTs. 424 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum.
Rts.) (no violation of article 10 since applicant's conviction under a valid law proscribing
Nazi organizations was necessary for the protection of public safety, national security,
and the rights and freedoms of others).
32. Malinverni, supra note 22, at 452; Engel v. Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 21 (1976).
33. Muchlinski, The Freedom of Speech and the European Human Rights Conven-
tion: The Sunday Times Case, 1979 TopicAL L. 1, 2 [hereinafter Muchlinski].
34. Judicial bodies that handle applications at Strasbourg alleging violation of the
Convention are the Commission, the European Court, and the Committee of Ministers.
See supra note 20.
35. Muchlinski, supra note 33, at 3. See Austria v. Italy, 1961 Y.B. EuR. CoNY. ON
HUM. RTS. 116, 138 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.). See also supra note 20 and infra notes
53-63 and accompanying text.
36. See Muchlinski, supra note 33, at 3; Human Rights Convention, supra note 2,
preamble.
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of expression be prescribed by law is intended to prevent vague-
ness and arbitrariness. 37 Additionally, the requirement that a re-
striction be "necessary" reflects a need for objective necessity,
while the words "in a democratic society" involve the protection
of general constitutional values.3 ' However, in article ten adjudi-
cation, the crucial issue has shifted from whether a restraint on
speech is objectively necessary to whether it is necessary to pre-
vent destruction of the values protected by the Convention.3
In the seminal article ten case, Handyside v. United King-
dom, 40 the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg (Eu-
ropean Court) rejected the applicant's claim that his obscenity
conviction violated article ten.41 United Kingdom authorities
had fined the applicant under an obscenity act for publication of
"The Little Red Schoolbook," despite the book's publication in
Denmark without any such difficulties.42 The European Court
established that a respondent state has the burden of showing
that a restriction is proportionate to a legitimate aim pursued;
this implies that the measure must be addressed toward a press-
ing social need.43 The reasons given by the state to justify the
restriction must also be relevant and sufficient under section two
of article ten.44 Further, where there is a vital public interest in
37. In Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979), the Euro-
pean Court explained that the phrase "prescribed by law" had two basic requirements.
First, a law must be adequately accessible, so that a citizen may know the legal rules
applicable to a given case. Second, a norm cannot be regarded as a law unless it is formu-
lated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. Id. at 31.
38. Muchlinski, supra note 33, at 2. The European Court has established that the
adjective "necessary" is synonomous neither with "indispensable" nor with the looser
test of "reasonable" or "desirable." Sunday Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36;
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22.
39. Muchlinski, supra note 33, at 6. However, a tendency emerged early in the Com-
mission to defer to a government's finding that a restriction was necessary as long as
there were reasonable grounds for such a finding, so that possibly too wide an area of
discretion was given to governments in nonemergency situations. Id. at 7. In X v. Aus-
tria, 1960 Y.B. EuR. CONy. oN HUM. RTS. 310 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.), the Commis-
sion hardly mentioned the facts and circumstances of the case in deciding that the re-
striction was acceptable simply because domestic law authorized it. The Commission did
not show that "in the circumstances of the case, the particular application of the law was
justifiable." Muchlinski, supra note 33, at 7-8.
40. 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 22-24. This proportionality test is derived from article 10's requirement
that a restriction be "necessary in a democratic society." Compare Handyside, 24 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23, with Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10.
44. Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22-24.
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communication of the restricted matter, a state needs to show
that free expression would necessarily have the adverse conse-
quences alleged.45
In the historic Sunday Times v. United Kingdom46 judg-
ment, the European Court applied these principles and held in
favor of free speech. The European Court reviewed the validity
of an injunction against the Sunday Times that halted publica-
tion of articles about children affected by the drug
thalidomide. 7 The injunction was allegedly necessary to protect
pending litigation on the thalidomide children. The House of
Lords found the injunction obligatory under the common law of
contempt. 4s The European Court held that the decision of the
House of Lords violated article ten.'9
The limits of a state's ability to abridge freedom of expres-
sion were substantially elaborated upon in both Handyside and
Sunday Times. Since it is the responsibility of signatory states
to secure for their citizens the freedoms enumerated in the Con-
vention, the court allows those states a margin of appreciation in
determining whether or not a pressing social need exists.50 How-
ever, since this domestic margin of appreciation "goes hand in
hand with a [E]uropean supervision," 51 this doctrine does not
grant unlimited deference to the findings of domestic authori-
ties. Where a restriction depends on a more shifting and subjec-
tive goal, the margin of appreciation accorded to national au-
thority is greater. In Handyside, the European Court found that
no uniform European conception of morals existed; thus, the
findings of the British tribunal in that case could not be dis-
turbed.52 However, in Sunday Times, the House of Lords deci-
45. McGregor, supra note 2, at 395. Other tests employed by the court include more
scrutiny according to a restriction's breadth and consideration of the practice of other
states parties to the Convention. Id. The best example of "a vital public interest" is the
articles on the drug thalidomide and its effects on children in the United Kingdom, en-
joined by the House of Lords in Attorney Gen. v. Times Newspapers, Ltd., 1974 A.C. 273
(1973). See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
46. 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
47. Id.
48. Attorney Gen. v. Times Newspapers, Ltd., 1974 A.C. 273 (1973).
49. Sunday Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979).
50. Id. at 36; Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22-23. The margin of apprecia-
tion doctrine means that some initial deference will be granted to a national authority's
determination that a restriction is necessary in a democratic society.
51. Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23; McGregor, supra note 2, at 394.
52. P. vAN DIJK & G. vAN HOOT, supra note 20, at 435. On the other hand, where a
restriction is aimed at a goal that is more objective in nature, the measure of deference
granted to a state is much lower. Handyside, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23; Sunday
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sion that an injunction was necessary in a democratic society did
not survive intensified scrutiny. Clearly, the scope of review ex-
ercised by the European Court in determining the necessity of a
restriction goes beyond whether a state has acted reasonably,
carefully, and in good faith."
The scope of review exercised by the European Court in
Sunday Times indicates that the Court is moving away from its
emphasis on objective necessity with respect to the exceptions in
article ten.54 The failure to consider the content of the values to
be protected under the Convention jeopardized the possibility of
ascertaining a common European standard of protection by
which the Convention should operate.55 The European Court
considered the facts and circumstances in Sunday Times in
more detail than in Handyside. By articulating the values article
ten seeks to protect and applying these values to the facts, the
European Commission on Human Rights (Commission) and the
European Court reaffirmed their obligation both to develop a
European standard of review, and to focus on the values the
Convention seeks to protect.
58
C. The Council of Europe and Freedom of Expression
The Council of Europe 57 has demonstrated a strong commit-
ment to protecting freedom of expression. The Consultative As-
sembly has declared that "the independence of the press and
other mass media from control by the state should be estab-
lished by law."5 8 This declaration points to the duty of authori-
Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36.
53. See Sunday Times, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36.
54. See Muchlinski, supra note 33, at 10-14. See also supra notes 34-39 and accom-
panying text. Previously, the Commission had tended to accept any executive action that
had the effect of protecting rights threatened by an exercise of freedom of expression,
irrespective of whether the democratic values embodied in the Convention were secured.
Id. at 9. See, e.g., X & German Ass'n of Z v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1963 Y.B.
EUR. CONY. ON HUM. RTs. 204 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.) (obscenity conviction of
newspaper distributor for selling nonpornographic magazines which might negatively in-
fluence adolescents upheld as within the state's margin of discretion). In that case, the
"in a democratic society" element was completely ignored. Muchlinski, supra note 33, at
9.
55. Muchlinski, supra note 33, at 10.
56. See Muchlinski, supra note 33, at 13-14, 21, 23.
57. See supra note 20.
58. Draft of Resolution 428, Eur. Consult. Ass., 18th Sess., Doc. No. 2687 (1970);
COUNCI. OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED TEXTS 908-09
(1979) (declaration on mass communication media and human rights) (resolution 428).
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ties to make available certain information so that mass commu-
nication media can fulfill their duty to give complete
information on public affairs.5 9 More important, the 1982 decla-
ration of Freedom of Expression and Information adopted by
the Committee of Ministers seeks, among other things, "the ab-
sence of censorship or any arbitrary controls or restraints on
participants in the information process, on media content, or
... on the dissemination of information."60
It is only in the last decade that Europeans have focused
their attention on issues related to broadcasting. The European
Community (EC) published a green paper in 1984 which ex-
plored the subject extensively.61 However, the Council of Europe
may be a more appropriate forum in which to develop policy and
law in European broadcasting as the green paper did not receive
a favorable response from all EC members.6 2 Furthermore, the
Council of Europe is better equipped to take into account shared
cultural features, languages, and interests of many European
states that are not EC members.6 3
The importance of broadcasting, and all media, to freedom
of expression is demonstrated by the changing role of govern-
ments in guaranteeing the rights provided in the Convention.
Today, governments must not only protect fundamental rights
from infringement, but also must take positive action to ensure
the existence of media able and prepared to supply information
to the public. 4
59. Id.
60. CouNcm OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: COLLECTED
TFXTS 206-07 (1987). See also McGregor, supra note 2, at 394 (discussing the declara-
tion). Although no declaration may bind a state as a matter of law, declarations are
incontrovertible as policy statements and examples of the objectives of the Council of
Europe. See supra note 20.
61. See Television without Frontiers - Green Paper on the Establishment of a
Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable, Commission of the
European Communities, COM (84) 300 final, June 14, 1984. A green paper is an exten-
sive report that examines a given topic.
.62. Springer, Mass Media Unlimited: A Challenge to the Council of Europe, FORUM
xxii-xxiii (1986) (Council of Europe quarterly) [hereinafter Springer]. See also European
Convention on Transfrontier Television, 28 I.L.M. 857 (1989) (reaffirming principles of
the free flow of information and ideas, the independence of broadcasters, the importance
of broadcasting for the development of culture and the free formation of opinions, and
the safeguarding of pluralism and equality of opportunity among all political parties)
(provisional edition).
63. Springer, supra note 62, at xxii.
64. COLLOQUY, supra note 23, at 122-23. This transformation of the duty of public
power is concerned with the view that public authority is obliged to take positive action
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D. The United Kingdom and the Convention
The United Kingdom ratified the Convention in 1951.65 In
January 1966 the United Kingdom recognized both the right of
an individual plaintiff to apply to the Commission for relief
under the Convention, and the compulsory jurisdiction of the
European Court." The Convention does not legally oblige signa-
tory states to incorporate its provisions into domestic law.
7
However, signatories are obliged to secure for anyone within
their jurisdiction the rights set forth therein." In ratifying the
Convention, the British executive assumed correctly that the
Convention did not require it to incorporate its provisions di-
rectly into internal law, and that at the time of ratification, in
the opinion of the government, British law adequately reflected
the Convention's requirements. 9 However, the issue of whether
British domestic law conforms to the Convention must be con-
stantly re-examined. This can be attributed to the general terms
in which the rights granted by the Convention are expressed,
in securing human rights. Id. See also Bullinger, supra note 23, at 382 (affirmative action
is imposed on member states under article 10).
65. Mann, Britain's Bill of Rights, 94 L.Q. REv. 512, 517 (1978) [hereinafter Mann].
66. Simmonds, The United Kingdom and the European Convention on Human
Rights, 15 INT'L & Com'. L.Q. 539 (1966); 1966 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 8 (Cmd. 2894). The
advent of the Convention in a nation that has no written constitution defining the rights
and liberties of its citizens meant that, for the first time, a comprehensive guarantee of
human rights would be applied throughout the United Kingdom as a whole. See gener-
ally HuAMN RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 20. The United Kingdom's declaration accepting
the right to individual petition was made in accordance with article 25 of the Conven-
tion, which sets forth the procedures for accepting that right. Human Rights Convention,
supra note 2, at art. 25. Prior to this, the United Kingdom could only be brought to the
European Court by a complaint filed by another state. Applications at Strasbourg are
handled first by the Commission. The Commission may examine an application if all
domestic remedies have been exhausted, and within six months of. the date when a final
decision was taken. Id. at art. 26. If the application is declared admissible, a friendly
settlement is attempted, through either the Committee of Ministers or the Commission.
If there is no friendly settlement, the case is referred to the European Court. Council of
Europe, What is the Council of Europe Doing to Protect Human Rights? 29 (1977).
67. A. DRZEMCZWSKI, supra note 20, at 55.
68. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1.
69. HOUSE OF LORDS, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON A BILL OF RIGHTS 27
(1978) [hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS]; A. DRZEMCZEWSKI, supra note 20, at 178. It thus
appeared that the Convention, having been complied with as far as the government was
concerned, would present no further developments in terms of the rights which it guar-
anteed. However, the fear that a future government might wish to curtail freedoms pre-
viously enjoyed made the Convention's guarantees more than mere words on paper. This
in turn was the chief value of the Convention to the ordinary citizen. See Shawcross,
United Kingdom Practice on the European Convention on Human Rights, 1965 BEL-
GIAN REV. INT'L L. 297, 300.
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and the evolutionary way in which they are interpreted."0
While the Crown (the executive branch) has historically had
the power to enter into international treaty obligations,7 1 British
law dictates that such treaties cannot take effect in domestic law
unless Parliament passes an enabling act. 2 As a result, because
Parliament has not incorporated the Convention, it has no effect
in British domestic law.73 Thus, the decisions of the European
Court are not legally binding on domestic courts. They ae, how-
ever, highly persuasive and do bind the United Kingdom on an
international plane. 4
The United Kingdom's acceptance of the private right of ac-
70. HOUSE OF LORDS, MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON A BILL OF RIGHTS 37 (1978) [hereinafter MINUTES OF EVIDENCE].
71. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *257; E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at
320.
72. The Parlement Belge, 4 P.D. 129 (1879); Walker v. Baird, 1892 A.C. 491 (P.C.)
(Nfld.); Attorney Gen. for Canada v. Attorney Gen. for Ontario, 1937 A.C. 326 (P.C.)
(Can.); Duffy, English Law and the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 585, 585 (1980) [hereinafter Duffy]. The absence of a bill of rights in the
United Kingdom has prompted many proposals that Parliament legislatively incorporate
the Convention into domestic law. The controversy surrounding a legislatively enacted
bill of rights revolves around the problem of entrenchment, namely, that any subsequent
Parliament can undo the actions of its predecessors. MINUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note
70, at 105, 162-63, 197. See generally Lester, Fundamental Rights: The United Kingdom
Isolated?, 1984 PuS. L. 46, 46-49 [hereinafter Lester, Fundamental Rights] (discussing
the dogma of Parliamentary sovereignty). Thus, the durability of a bill of rights (whether
based on the Convention or not) would be enveloped in uncertainty. At present, British
constitutional rights are derived from constitutional conventions, court decisions, and
acts of Parliament. Since Parliament may at any time overrule any other constitutional
authority, the government of the day, if ensured a clear majority in the House of Com-
mons, has virtually unchecked authority. Andrews, The European Jurisprudence on
Human Rights, 43 MD. L. REV. 463, 482 (1984).
73. Duffy, supra note 72, at 615. Among Council of Europe member states that have
not incorporated the Convention into their domestic law, the United Kingdom is the
only one in which there is no written constitution guaranteeing some or all of the rights
protected by the Convention. hNUTES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 70, at 116. One of the
strongest arguments against incorporation of the Convention is that it would politicize
the role of the judiciary. While prompted by concerns for separation of powers, this argu-
ment does not address the need for protection of human rights in society. Kerridge, In-
corporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into United Kingdom Do-
mestic Law, in THE EFFECT ON ENGLISH DOMESTIC LAW OF MIEMBERSHIP IN TE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIEs AND RATIFICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 247,
260-63 (1983) [hereinafter Kerridge]. Kerridge concludes that British judges are in polit-
ics whether they like it or not, and proposes a separate constitutional court (as in the
Federal Constitutional Court of West Germany) to deal preliminarily with constitutional
questions, thus disposing of controversial issues before they reach the ordinary courts.
Id. at 261-62.
74. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 53; A. DRzEMczE:wSIu, supra
note 20, at 316.
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tion naturally resulted in an increased role for the Convention in
domestic law. Although the Convention has been cited in courts
throughout the United Kingdom,7 5 the Convention's erratic his-
tory has clouded its certainty as a guide to judicial decisionmak-
ing. Thus, some British judges gladly turn to the Convention,
while others refuse to do So.7 The Convention's present position
as a strictly international obligation in British law is unlikely to
change without the necessary enabling legislation by
Parliament."
The first reliance on the Convention in a British decision
was in 1974 .7 The Convention's present status in English do-
75. Notably, some of these decisions demonstrate a judicial sensitivity to protecting
human rights so that the United Kingdom's obligations under the Convention are not
underemphasized. Compare Regina v. Deery, 1977 N.Ir. 164 (Crim. App.) (holding that
the Convention is a strong guide in construing ambiguous or unclear domestic legisla-
tion) and Regina v. McCormick, 1977 N.Ir. 105 (Belfast City Comm'n) (finding, after a
careful examination of the Strasbourg case law on the relevant provisions of the Conven-
tion, that the statutory provision in question had incorporated the Convention's guide-
lines into domestic law) with Kaur v. Lord Advocate, [1980] 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 79
(Scot. Sess., outer house) (rejecting plaintiff's claims outright on ground that the Con-
vention is not part of Scottish law, and also rejecting the limited recourse to the Conven-
tion allowed in English law). The McCormick case is an object lesson on how the Con-
vention's case law can be used by domestic courts to clarify an ambiguity in British law.
Duffy, supra note 72, at 589.
76. See Lester, The United Kingdom and the International Covenants, 2 HuM.
RTs. REv. 58, 64 (1977) (quoting Lord Scarman's Hamlyn Lectures) [hereinafter Lester,
The United Kingdom]. See also Warbrick, European Convention on Human Rights and
English Law, 130 NEw L.J. 852 (1980) ("there is a danger that the Convention will be
used as a convenient peg on which to hang a judicial inclination, the very arbitrariness of
the decisions being used by opponents of the Convention to underline their more wide-
ranging objections to it").
77. Lester, The United Kingdom, supra note 76, at 63. The second of three readings
before the House of Lords of a bill proposing incorporation of the Convention into Brit-
ish law was approved of by a vote of 56 to 30. Kerridge, supra note 73, at 249. The bill
later failed. Although the United Kingdom has chosen not to incorporate the Conven-
tion, the House of Lords Committee on incorporation unanimously concluded that if a
bill of rights were to be adopted, it would be through direct incorporation of the Conven-
tion. See Lester, Fundamental Rights, supra note 72, at 62; BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
69, at 20. However, to say that incorporating the Convention into domestic law would
invade Parliamentary sovereignty begs the question by what logic the Convention was
ratified in the first place. Kerridge, supra note 73, at 251. Those who advocate that there
is no need to incorporate because British law already complies fully with the Convention
support an unsound argument. There could be no possible harm from incorporation if
the United Kingdom were already complying with the Convention. Id. at 253-54.
78. See Regina v. Miah, [1974] 1 All E.R. 1110 (C.A.), aff'd sub nom. Waddington v.
Miah, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 683 (H.L.) (referring to presumption against certain criminal leg-
islation as a result of the Convention). The effect of the Convention as an instrument in
statutory interpretation has undergone many changes. Lord Denning, in a series of deci-
sions, suggested first that legislation which did not conform to the Convention might
have to be held per se invalid. Birdi v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, 119 Sol. J.
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mestic courts allows for its usage in resolving statutory ambigu-
ity and uncertainty in the law.79 In 1980 the court of appeal held
that even the Home Secretary himself was not obliged, in exer-
cising his statutory powers, to take into account the provisions
of the Convention. 0
E. Freedom of Expression and the British Media
The United Kingdom is unusual in that it has no written
constitution. Rather, freedom of speech, expression, and the
press are often referred to as "residual rights.""' Domestic law
takes these rights for granted; what is left is a residual liberty to
impart information and ideas if they are not restricted by law.
8 2
332, 61 I.L.R. 250 (C.A. 1975). He then remarked, in dicta, that his previous statements
should be cut back. However, he added, that those who administer and apply the law
ought to have regard to the Convention in carrying out their duties. Regina v. Secretary
of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Bhajan Singh, 1976 Q.B. 198, 207 (C.A.). In Regina
v. Chief Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport ex parte Salamat Bibi, [1976] 1 W.L.R.
979 (C.A.), Lord Denning revoked his earlier suggestion that officials should specifically
take the Convention into account when administering rules made by Parliament or a
Minister, since Parliament, or the Minister, would already have done so. Id. at 984-85.
79. Id. See also Duffy, supra note 72, at 587. Additionally, the Convention could be
introduced into domestic law via the common law. The principle that customary interna-
tional law forms part of the law of the land in the United Kingdom allows a unique
exception to the rule that unincorporated treaties are not part of domestic law. As a
result, portions of the Convention could effectively be incorporated into the common law
if adopted by usage or judicial decision. The Convention could also enter the common
law as an obligation of public policy. However, these options have not historically been
relied on very much. See id. at 605-07, 612; Drzemczewski, supra note 17, at 40, 46. One
British author has concluded, in "a depressing glance at English judges' reactions to
human rights claims," that "the common law seems as obdurate as an old ass in its
resistance to change through the influence df human rights." Feldman, Influences on
Judicial Reasoning, in THE EFFECT ON ENGLISH DOMESTIC LAW OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND RATIFICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 27 (1983).
80. Fernandes v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, 1981 Imm. A.R. 1, 78 I.L.R.
37 (C.A. 1980).
81. E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 502; see 502 PARL. DE., H.L. (6th ser.)
687 (1988).
82. E. WADE & G. PHImLIPS, supra note 4, at 501-02; JUSTICE: THE BRITISH SECTION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE LAW 6
(1990). Civil and criminal restraints on these freedoms include the laws of defamation,
libel, obscenity and sedition, and copyright laws. E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, supra note 4,
at 501-26. One of the oldest and most respected recognitions of freedom of speech was
made in Bonnard v. Perryman, [1891] 2 Ch. 269 (C.A.), where Lord Chief Justice Coler-
idge stated that "[t]he right of free speech is one which it is for the public interest that
individuals should possess ... and exercise without impediment, so long as no wrongful
act is done . . . ." Id. at 284. Even earlier, in a seminal declaration of free expression
under the common law, Lord Mansfield stated that "[t]he liberty of the press consists in
printing without any previous licen[s]e, subject to the consequence of the law." Rex v.
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However, Lord Kilbrandon has referred to what he regards, at
least since the Convention was ratified, as the existence of a con-
stitutional right to free speech.1
3
Broadcasting in the United Kingdom is generally divided
between the statutorily created Independent Broadcasting Au-
thority (IBA) and the government owned British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC). Although networks are supposed to deter-
mine their program content independently, the IBA and BBC
must satisfy themselves, so far as possible, that nothing is in-
cluded in their programming that "offends against good taste or
decency, is likely to encourage or incite to crime or to lead to
disorder, or to be offensive to public feeling.""4 If the IBA or
BBC is in breach of its duties, the remedy is an injunction or
suit against them.85 Courts, however, are extremely reluctant to
act as censors of these bodies.88
Broadcasting guidelines for BBC coverage of Northern Ire-
land prior to 1988 involved a complex hierarchy of editorial
clearances before programs could be transmitted.87 However,
there was no advance prohibition on who or what groups could
be interviewed, or when they could be interviewed.88 The IBA,
on the other hand, was regulated by regular, confidential meet-
ings between its chairman, the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, and the Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabu-
lary, the Northern Irish police force.' Even in the absence of
Dean of St. Asaph, 100 E.R. 657, 661 (K.B. 1784).
83. Cassel v. Broome, 1972 A.C. 1027, 1133 (discussing punitive damages with re-
spect to commercial publication). Similarly, in Regina v. Wells Street Stipendiary Magis-
trate ex parte Deakin, 1980 A.C. 477 (1979), Lord Diplock criticized the law of defama-
tory libel as out of tune with the United Kingdom's international obligations, and
referred unambiguously to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Convention. Id.
at 482-83.
84. Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 4. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
is regulated by similar language under its Charter, License, and Agreement. See infra
note 102.
85. E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 524-26.
86. E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 526.
87. See A. SCHMIm & J. nz GRAAF, supra note 8, at 158-62. The managing director of
the BBC for Northern Ireland, the Controller Northern Ireland, and the News Editor
Northern Ireland had to be consulted as part of the "referral up" system in place previ-
ously. Id. at 160. Additionally, no interview with an IRA member was permissible with-
out being first cleared by the editor of news and current affairs. Id.
88. A. SCHUm & J. DE GRAr, supra note 8, at 160.
89. A. SCHMm & J. DE GRw,, supra note 8, at 159. It should be noted that the
government conceded that its decision to censor the BBC and Independent Broadcasting
Authority (IBA) "should not be taken as implying that the government considered that
the broadcasting authorities had failed in the past to observe their duties in relation to
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formal censorship, governmental pressure on major networks re-
sulted in a good deal of self-censorship throughout the 1970s.11
F. Principles of British Adminstrative Law
Judicial review of administrative action in British law is
governed in part by the Wednesbury91 standard. Wednesbury
review scrutinizes administrative action to determine whether a
minister has followed the statutory objective, and whether the
minister has refrained from taking into account irrelevant con-
siderations.2 Once those questions are answered in favor of the
minister, a decision may only be reversed if a court finds that
the minister has come to a conclusion so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority could ever have come to it.93
The Wednesbury standard applies to administrative deci-
sions made by the executive branch.94 Under the Wednesbury
the contents of broadcasts." Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte
Brind, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 787, 795 (C.A. 1989) (per Donaldson, M.R.) (quoting affidavit of
Under-Secretary C.L. Scoble).
90. A. SCHmID & J. DE GRAAF, supra note 8, at 159-61. The excessive influence of the
government in media coverage in Northern Ireland compels the conclusion that as long
as the BBC and IBA are "too responsible and responsive to the government, and not
enough to the Irish reality and the British public," media coverage in Northern Ireland
will be incomplete, and the public and the direct victims of terrorism will suffer as a
result. Id. at 162. Instead of government ordered guidelines, or guidelines designed by
the media, Schmid and de Graaf propose a democratically elected, impartial media coun-
cil to decide on censorship guidelines, restoring censorship to the public, in whose inter-
est the news is disseminated in the first place. Id. at 172-74.
91. Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B.
223 (1947) (per Greene, M.R.) (C.A.). In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for
Civil Service, 1985 A.C. 374 (1984), Lord Diplock stated that administrative actions
could also be reviewed if they were illegal, that is, if the decisionmaker did not under-
stand correctly the law that regulated his decisionmaking power, or give effect to it. Re-
view was also available if there existed a "procedural impropriety" in a decision. Further,
Lord Diplock expressly left open the possibility of introducing proportionality review
into British domestic law. Id. at 410. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. See also
infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
92. Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B.
223 (1947) (C.A.).
93. Id. For a detailed examination of the flaws and shortcomings of Wednesbury
review where fundamental human rights are concerned, see Jowell & Lester, Beyond
"Wednesbury:" Substantive Principles of Administrative Law, 1984 PuB. L. 368 [herein-
after Jowell & Lester]. The authors make effective arguments that it is possible to de-
velop independent principles allowing substantive review so as to strengthen the protec-
tion of fundamental rights against the misuse of official discretion, without violation of
separation of powers. Id. at 368-69. The authors also give several examples of substantive
review in British cases, lurking beneath "Wednesbury's ample cloak." Id. at 371-72.
94. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Env't ex parte Nottinghamshire County
Council, [1986] 1 A.C. 240 (1985) (per Lord Scarman).
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standard, British courts can reverse political judgments made by
the executive branch only if they are "perverse or absurd." 95 Os-
tensibly, this standard of review makes no allowance for sub-
stantive review of a decision. Judges are therefore extremely re-
luctant to articulate principled justifications for intervention in
administrative decisions.96 The most important limitation on ju-
dicial review of administrative action in the United Kingdom is
that "it is a supervisory and not an appellate jurisdiction.
'97
The British judiciary, concerned with maintaining separation of
powers and stemming the prolific use of judicial review of ad-
minstrative decisions, has reacted by intentionally limiting ad-
ministrative review to abuses of that power.98
III. REGINA V. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HomE DEPARTMENT
EX PARTE BRIND
A. Facts
The British Parliament has passed a variety of emergency
legislation in attempting to deal with the difficult situation in
Northern Ireland. On October 19, 1988, in response to renewed
terrorist *activity by extremists in Northern Ireland, Douglas
Hurd, then Secretary of State for the Home Department, issued
95. Id. at 248.
96. Jowell & Lester, supra note 93, at 371-72.
97. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind, [1990] 2 W.L.R.
787, 802 (C.A. 1989) (per Donaldson, M.R.) (emphasis in original).
98. See Puhlhofer v. Hillingdon London Borough Council, [1986] 1 A.C. 484, 502
(per Lord Brightman).
99. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, enacted to protect the
public against terrorism, enables security forces to search, question and arrest people
suspected of being involved in terrorism, and empowers the Secretary of State to pro-
scribe terrorist organizations. Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5;
NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 6, at 11. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions)
Act also significantly broadens the Royal Ulster Constabulary's power of arrest when
emergency conditions exist. W. HELLERSTEIN, R. McKAY & R. ScHLm, supra note 6, at
129. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 (PTA), applicable
throughout the United Kingdom, permits warrantless arrests of persons the police rea-
sonably suspect are involved in terrorist activities. Such suspects may be held 48 hours
or more "with the approval of the Home Secretary or the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland for up to a further five days." Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act, 1984, ch. 8; NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 6, at 12. The PTA also allows for the
exclusion of suspected terrorists from the United Kingdom at the discretion of the Home
Secretary. W. HELLERSTEIN, R. McKAY & R. ScHLAm, supra note 6, at 125. The proce-
dures under which these exclusions are made "are, prima facie, a breach of natural jus-
tice and the due process provisions of article [6] of the Convention." ARTICLE 19: THE
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE ON CENSORSHIP, No CoMMENT:. CENSORSHIP, SECRECY AND THE
IRISH TROUBLES 16 (1989) [hereinafter No CoMhMENT].
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a set of restrictions to the BBC and IBA.10 The restrictions re-
quired them to stop broadcasting direct statements of certain
extremist groups. 01 The remainder of the restrictions (the sup-
100. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 1
(Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file). On Remembrance
Sunday of 1987, an IRA bomb exploded at Enniskillen, Northern Ireland, killing 11 civil-
ians. In August 1988 a bus bomb attack in Ballygawley, Northern Ireland killed eight
soldiers. These incidents were major factors in prompting the restrictions. See NORTHERN
IRELAND, supra note 6, at 3; 500 PARL. DEB., H.L. (6th ser.) 1144 (1988); 138 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (6th ser.) 896 (1988); The Guardian, Oct. 20, 1988, at 1, col. 1. On October 26, 1989,
after a shakeup in the British cabinet, Home Secretary Hurd was appointed Foreign
Secretary by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1989, at Al, col. 2.
101. The Independent, Oct. 20, 1988, at 1, col. 1. The restrictions were served by
notice upon the BBC and IBA, pursuant to section 29(3) of the 1981 Broadcasting Act
(Broadcasting Act), with respect to the latter, and clause 13(4) of the Charter, License,
and Agreement of 1981, with respect to the former. Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 1-2
(Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file). Throughout this Com-
ment, the provisions and duties specified in the Broadcasting Act will be used to refer
also to the Charter, License, and Agreement, since they are effectively identical.
The Broadcasting Act provides in part that "the Secretary of State may at any time
by notice in writing require the [IBA] to refrain from broadcasting any matter ... speci-
fied in the notice." Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 29.
The restrictions issued by the Home Secretary provide in part that:
1. [The BBC and BA are required] to refrain at all times from sending any
broadcast matter which consists of or includes any words spoken . .. by a
person who appears or is heard on the programme [sic]... where (a) the per-
son speaking the words represents or purports to represent [any organization
proscribed in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 or
the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, Sinn Fein, Republican
Sinn Fein, or the Ulster Defence Association,] or (b) the words support or so-
licit or invite support for such an organization, [except for] any matter speci-
fied in paragraph 3 below ....
3. [The matter referred to] above is any words spoken (a) in the course of
proceedings in Parliament, or (b) by or in support of a candidate at a parlia-
mentary, European Parliamentary or local election pending that election.
Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 1 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library,
cases file).
The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act applies to the IRA, Cumann na
mBan, Fianna na h-Eireann, the Red Hand Commandos, Saor Eire, the Ulster Freedom
Fighters, the Ulster Volunteer Force, and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1978, ch. 5, § 21, sched. 2.
The IRA includes both the Official IRA and its radical and more violent wing, the
Provisional IRA, or "Provo." Cumann na mBan is the women's section of the IRA, whose
members have been utilized by the Provisional IRA in its campaign of terrorism, and
whose members have even placed bombs. W. FLACKES, supra note 6, at 74. Fianna na h-
Eireann is the youth wing of the Provisional IRA, whose services have also been utilized
in carrying bombs, moving weapons, and acting as decoys. Id. at 95. The Red Hand
Commandos are a unionist paramilitary group, launched in 1972 and associated with the
Ulster Volunteer Force. Id. at 200. Saor Eire is a left wing nationalist group regarded by
security forces in Northern Ireland as a minor element in the violence. Id. at 208. The
Ulster Freedom Fighters are a Protestant paramilitary group that split from the Ulster
Defence Association in 1973. They have taken credit for some of the most critical assassi-
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port clause) also banned the direct broadcast of words that sup-
ported, solicited, or invited support for such extremists.102 The
Home Secretary had not previously availed himself of this power
under the 1981 Broadcasting Act (Broadcasting Act).0 s Further-
more, no previous use of the power under antecedent statutes
had ever involved such a sweeping and drastic restraint.'04 The
restrictions produced cries of outrage by civil libertarians, 05 cre-
nations of nationalist sympathizers. Id. at 233-34. The Ulster Volunteer Force is another
Protestant paramilitary force. It once declared that its intention was to mercilessly kill
IRA men. Id. at 242-43. The INLA is the quantitatively insignificant military wing of the
Irish Republican Socialist Party. It is dedicated to bombing and violence. Id. at 121-22.
While section I of the PTA bans the IRA and the INLA, this section does not apply
in Northern Ireland, since it would otherwise overlap with the Northern Ireland Act,
which already bans them. W. HELLERSTEI, R. McKAY & R. SCHLAM, supra note 6, at
128.
Sinn Fein, or Provisional Sinn Fein, the political counterpart of the Provisional IRA,
is a fully legalized party in the United Kingdom, despite its dedication to British with-
drawal from Northern Ireland. W. FLACKES, supra note 6, at 196-97. Republican Sinn
Fein, or Official Sinn Fein, is a fervently marxist political party, which emerged after a
split within Sinn Fein in 1970. The trend of Republican Sinn Fein is to renounce
paramilitarism, as a result of which its proscription was removed by the British govern-
ment in 1973. Id. at 256. The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the largest Protestant
paramilitary organization, though never yet proscribed, has been associated with the
Ulster Freedom Fighters and has spawned the Ulster Loyalist Democratic Party. Id. at
229-33.
The restrictions avoid a head-on conflict with the case law of the Commission by
allowing a relaxation of the restrictions during election periods. In X & Ass'n of Z v.
United Kingdom, 1971 Y.B. Eum CONY. ON HUM. RTs. 538 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum. Rts.),
the Commission remarked, in dicta, that a denial to a political party (such as Sinn Fein)
of access to broadcasting during election time would raise an issue under article 10. Id. at
546. However, extant restrictions in the Republic of Ireland would stand in clear viola-
tion of this dictum. See infra note 121.
102. Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 1 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen
library, cases file).
103. See supra note 101.
104. No COMMENT, supra note 99, at 24-25. See infra note 156. It should be noted
that "the near absolutist American judicial opposition to prior restraint has not been
matched in Europe." Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 537, 554 (1988). But see Attorney General v. B.B.C., 1981 A.C. 303, 362
(1980) (per Lord Scarman) ("the prior restraint of publication though occassionally nec-
essary in serious cases is a drastic interference with freedom of speech and should only
be ordered where there is [a] . . . 'pressing social need' ").
105. See, e.g., Nightline: Censorship, Suspension of Rights in England (ABC televi-
sion broadcast, Oct. 21, 1988) (transcript on file in the Brooklyn Journal of Interna-
tional Law library) [hereinafter Nightline], where Kevin Boyle, former Chairman of arti-
cle 19, which observes the safeguard of freedom of expression as guaranteed under article
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, stated that "[]iberty is ill in [Britain],
and we really have no doctor to go to, we do not have, as in your case, a Supreme Court
where we can challenge [the constitutionality of] what a government does." Id. at 2. At
the same time, the right to silence to avoid self-incrimination, one of the oldest of indi-
vidual rights, has also been curtailed considerably by the Thatcher government. Id. at 2,
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ated mass confusion for BBC and IBA broadcasters, 1°0 and
prompted court challenges in both Northern Ireland'07  and
Great Britain.10 8
On February 22, 1989, six journalists and ari employee of
the National Union of Journalists0 9 brought suit challenging the
restrictions of the Home Secretary as ultra vires and void."10 The
remedy sought by the plaintiffs was an order of certiorari."'
The plaintiffs contended that the Home Secretary had ex-
5-7. It has been suggested that these extreme remedies, at the expense of civil liberty,
deal excessively with the symptoms of terrorism and not with the roots. Boston Glob6,
Oct. 24, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
106. See Birt, supra note 10, at 21.
107. The restrictions were challenged in the Northern Ireland high court by Belfast
broadcasting journalists Christopher Moore and David Lynas on the ground they vio-
lated the 1973 Northern Ireland Constitution Act, which states that "discrimination
against anyone on the grounds of politics or religion is unlawful." Hunter, Broadcast Ban
Court Actions, 138 NEW L.J. 925 (1988); Piette, Legal Challenges to the Broadcasting
Ban, 18 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP 7 (Feb. 1989). Additionally, a suit filed in Belfast by Sinn
Fein Councillor Mitchell McLaughlin foundered when he was denied legal aid. No Com-
MENT, suPRA note 99, at 95. The court of appeal reversed this determination one year
later and ordered that legal aid be provided and the case set for argument in the high
court. Press Association Newsfile, Apr. 27, 1990 (NEXIS).
108. On January 17, 1989, the divisional court (Watkins & Mann, L.JJ., & Mc-
Cowan, J.), "with some hesitation," granted leave to challenge the legality of the restric-
tions. Daily Telegraph, Jan. 18, 1989, at 3, col. 5.
109. The six journalists were Donald Malcolm Brind, a BBC producer; Fred Albert
Emery, a television journalist; Alexander Graham, a television producer and editor; Vic-
toria Leonard, an LBC producer; Scarlett MccGwire, joint NUM president and broad-
caster; and John Richard Pilger, a television and radio presenter. The other plaintiff was
Thomas Edward Nash, assistant to the NUJ general secretary. See also The Times
(London), May 27, 1989, at 4, col. 1; Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 3-4 (Q.B. Div'l Ct.,
May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases fie).
110. Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 5 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen
library, cases file). The doctrine of ultra vires, perhaps the central principle of British
administrative law, is based on the proposition that a public authority may not act
outside, or in excess of, its powers. H. WADE, ADmnsmATxv LAW 40-41 (1977). The
doctrine of ultra vires has unique constitutional and judicial importance because British
judges have no right to interfere with an administrative decision unless it contravenes
the will of Parliament as expressed in the statute conferring the power. Id. at 42. As a
result, the ultra vires doctrine has become a procrustean bed into which British judges
have subsumed instances of inconsistency with a statute, failure by a minister to follow
expressly prescribed procedure, irregular delegation and breach of jurisdictional condi-
tions, unreasonableness, irrelevant considerations, improper motives, and breach of natu-
ral justice. Id. at 43.
111. Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 5 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen
library, cases file). In British law, the prerogative remedy of certiorari brings up to the
high court an administrative decision so that it may be investigated. If the decision is
ultra vires, it is quashed and declared completely or partially invalid by the court. H.
WADE, ADmNISTRATIVE LAW 546-47, 550-51 (1982). In cases involving certiorari, the
Crown is the nominal plaintiff but is expressed to act on behalf of the applicant. Id. at
547.
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ceeded the scope of his powers under the Broadcasting Act.112
They also contended that the restrictions were disproportionate
to the mischief the Home Secretary was seeking to avoid (the
direct broadcast of extremist groups).11 3 Finally, the plaintiffs
charged that the Home Secretary's decision was unreasonable
under the Wednesbury standard.11 4 The plaintiffs argued that
there were no clear standards for deciding whether potential
broadcast material fell within the restrictions. They also com-
plained that the restrictions interfered with the broadcasters'
editorial control and the ability of the public to freely receive
information. 1 "
Responding to plaintiffs' contentions, the government ar-
gued that four matters had prompted it to take action against
terrorism."' First, the government noted the offense caused to
viewers and listeners by the appearance of apologists for terror-
ism, particularly after a terrorist outrage.11 7 Second, the govern-
ment cited the undeserved publicity given to terrorists by media
coverage."' Third, the government contended that such appear-
ances tended to increase the standing of terrorists and create the
false impression that support for terrorism itself is a legitimate
political opinion." 9 Fourth, the government claimed that broad-
cast statements were intended to have, and sometimes did have,
the effect of intimidating some of those at whom they were
directed.
20
112. Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 8 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen
library, cases file). See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. See infra note 125.
113. Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 9 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen
library, cases file). The plaintiffs also contended that the restrictions were unlawful in
that they conflicted with the duties of the BBC and the IBA to report current affairs
fully and impartially. Id.
114. Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B.
223 (1947) (C.A.). See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
115. Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 4 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen
library, cases fie).
116. C0/1756/88, slip op. at 18 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen li-
brary, cases file); [1990] 2 W.L.R. 787, 793-94 (C.A. 1989) (per Donaldson, M.R.); id. at
809 (per McCowan, L.J.).
117. CO/1756/88, slip op. at 19 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen li-
brary, cases file); [1990] 2 W.L.R. 787, 794 (C.A. 1989) (per Donaldson, M.R.); id. at 809
(per McCowan, L.J.) (quoting affidavit of Under-secretary C.L. Scoble).
118. [1990] 2 W.L.R. at 794 (per Donaldson, M.R.).
119. Id.
120. [1990] 2 W.L.R. 787, 794-95 (C.A. 1989) (per Donaldson, M.R.); id. at 809 (per
Mcowan, L.J.); see CO/1756/88, slip op. at 19 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, cases file).
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B. The Divisional Court
The court refused to consider the plaintiffs' claim regarding
the proportionality of the restrictions. The court noted that any
disproportion of the restrictions to "the mischief to be avoided"
or "benefit to be obtained" had no bearing on the lawfulness of
the decision.121 To apply such a standard would result in courts
substituting their own decisions for that of the minister, which
would violate British separation-of-powers principles. 122 The
court held that this claim should be resolved by asking whether
any reasonable minister, properly directing himself as to the law,
would have made such a decision. 23 The court proceeded to an-
alyze whether the Home Secretary exceeded the limitations on
his power imposed by both domestic law'24 and the Conven-
tion. 25 The court then stated that the Convention and Euro-
121. CO/1756/88, slip op. at 10 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen li-
brary, cases file). The court also noted the existence of more severe restrictions in the
Republic of Ireland and attached significance to the approval of the restrictions by Par-
liament. Id. at 6, 10. A notice issued under the Irish Broadcasting Authority Act, which
governs the transmissions of Radio Telefis Eireann (the broadcasting entity in the Re-
public of Ireland), prohibits broadcasting of "an interview, or report of an interview with
a spokesman ... for any one or more of the following organizations." No COMMENT,
supra note 99, at 34; see Broadcasting Authority Act, No.37, § 16 (Ir. 1976) (amending
Broadcasting Authority Act, No.10, § 31 (Ir. 1960)) (emphasis added). See infra notes
225-26 and accompanying text. In August 1989 the NUJ and Federated Workers' Union
of Ireland launched a challenge to the Irish broadcasting ban in the Commission. The
applicants alleged violations of article 10 (freedom of expression), article 14 (discrimina-
tion), article 6 (right to effective remedies) and Protocol 1, article 3 (freedom of expres-
sion in connection with elections) of the Convention. No COMMENT, supra note 99, at 95.
A challenge of the British restrictions is expected to be filed in the Commission upon
exhaustion of domestic remedies, after which the challenge may be consolidated with the
Irish proceedings. See id. at 94; de Smith, Broadcasting and Northern Ireland: Consti-
tutional Issues?, 139 NEW L.J. 1240, 1241 (1989).
122. Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 10 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Eng-
gen library, cases file).
123. Id. at 9-10.
124. The Home Secretary (or any Minister), in exercising his statutory powers, must
identify correctly the policy and objectives of an act, and then take account of them.
Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 11 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library,
cases file) (citing Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, 1968 A.C. 997).
In delimiting the apparently unlimited censorship powers accorded to the Home Secre-
tary by the Broadcasting Act, the court relied on a statement by Lord Diplock in Gar-
land v. British Rail for the proposition that "[in construing] United Kingdom statutes
... the words of a statute passed after [a convention] has been signed and dealing with
the subject matter of the international obligation[s] of the United Kingdom, are to be
construed, [if possible], as intended to carry out the obligation, and to be consistent with
it." Id. at 14 (citing [1983] 2 A.C. 751). Thus, the court justified article 10 of the Conven-
tion as a limitation on the Home Secretary's power.
125. Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 10-15 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS,
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pean Court case law should be considered in cases where United
Kingdom law is not firmly settled. 26 The court compared the
limitations in section two of article ten of the Convention to the
the duties imposed on the BBC and IBA by the Broadcasting
Act and found them substantially the same. However, the court
found a difference in that the Broadcasting Act's reference to
"matter[s] likely to be offensive to the public feeling"'27 was a
significant departure from the provisions of article ten of the
Convention,' s which permits narrowly drawn restrictions in the
"general" interests of public welfare.' 29
The court's standard of review with respect to the Home
Secretary's decisions obliged it to first inquire into the reasons
for the decisions.130 In examining these reasons, the court stated
it would "consider whether there existed a pressing social need
for the directions."I'' Based upon the affidavits of the govern-
ment and the debates in Parliament,1 32 the court found that
Enggen library, cases file). All parties stipulated that there were limitations on the Home
Secretary's discretion, regardless of the plain language of section 29(3) of the Broadcast-
ing Act. The court justified its failure to address the journalists' argument that a minis-
ter must exercise his powers in accordance with freedom of expression as protected by
the common law by finding that the Convention was not incorporated into the common
law, and that the restrictions were not in violation of the Convention. Cf. id. at 13, 19
("fact that the common law may be identical to . . . [a]rticle 10 does not assist
[plaintiffs]").
126. Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 14-15 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, cases file). The court followed Attorney General v. B.B.C., 1981 A.C. 303
(1980), where Lord Fraser noted that "[United Kingdom] courts. . . should have regard
to the provisions of the Convention... and to the decisions of the [European] Court
... in cases ... where our domestic law is not firmly settled." Id. at 352.
127. Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68, § 4(1)(a). See supra note 84 and accompanying
text.
128. Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 17 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Eng-
gen library, cases file). See supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
129. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10, § 2. See supra notes
28-32 and accompanying text.
130. See Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 17 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, cases file).
131. Id. at 18. However, the court warned that it would in no way decide for itself
whether a pressing social need in fact existed. Id. This apparent contradiction can be
attributed to the court's reluctance to pass any sort of political judgment on the expedi-
ence of the restrictions. Id. at 7, 10, 18.
132. Parliamentary approval of the restrictions is not required, and the Parliamen-
tary debates produced no actual legislation. Cf. Broadcasting Act, 1981, ch. 68 passim
(no Parliamentary approval required for actions of the Home Secretary). Rather, Parlia-
ment approved the restrictions under the assumption that the Home Secretary's actions
were lawful, a matter that only the judiciary may determine. Regina v. Secretary of State
for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 787, 796 (C.A. 1989) (per Donald-
son, M.R.).
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there existed prima facie evidence that the restrictions were in-
troduced in the interests of public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, and for the protection of the rights of
others.133 Any burdens and difficulties in implementing the re-
strictions, and any international ramifications emanating from
the restrictions, were held by the court to have been duly con-
sidered by the Home Secretary and Parliament.1 3 4 As a result,
the Home Secretary's decision could not "be said to be perverse
or absurd."'138 Thus, the court refused to find the Home Secre-
tary's decision unreasonable. 3
Finally, the court considered whether the restrictions them-
selves, rather than the decisions to issue them, were unreasona-
ble according to the Wednesbury standard. The court rejected
all claims as to overbreadth and refused to accept that any diffi-
culties engendered by the restrictions could not be overcome.
Consequently, the court refused to find the restrictions
unreasonable.1
37
C. The Court of Appeal
The court of appeal unanimously affirmed the divisional
court."3 s Lord Donaldson held that the issue of whether British
common and statutory law were inconsistent with the United
Kingdom's obligations under the Convention was a matter for
the European Court and not for British courts. Lord Donaldson
133. Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 19 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Eng-
gen library, cases file). The court found that the government's contentions regarding in-
timidatory statements by the extremists were wrong as a matter of fact, but declined to
make a decision on the government's first ground, namely that offense had been caused
to viewers and listeners by the appearance of the apologists for terrorism, particularly
after a terrorist outbreak. Id. The court might very well have declared the latter conten-
tion wrong as a matter of law since such a restriction would not fall within section 2 of
article 10. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10, § 2.
134. Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 21-22 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26,1989) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, cases fie).
135. Id. at 22.
136. Id. at 19-20. As for the arguments that the restrictions conflicted with the jour-
nalists' duties under the Broadcasting Act, and prevented them from reporting current
affairs impartially, the court held that the journalists were required by the Broadcasting
Act to report events with due impartiality, which meant that complete impartiality was
not required. Id. at 20-21.
137. Id. at 22-23.
138. Brind [1990] 2 W.L.R. 787, 796 (C.A. 1989) (opinions per Donaldson, M.R., &
Gibson & McCowan, L.JJ.). The disposition in the court of appeal is included for the
benefit of the reader, but the analysis in this Comment focuses mostly on the decision in
the divisional court, and not the subsequent appeal.
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stated that the duty of the British courts is to decide disputes
under British domestic law as it is and not as it would be if full
effect were given to the Convention.3 " Two judges explicitly re-
jected the divisional court's holding that article ten of the Con-
vention acted as an express limitation on the Home Secretary's
power.
140
Lord Donaldson found no ambiguity in the terms of the
Broadcasting Act. Thus, under British law, the terms of the
Convention were irrelevant to the Home Secretary's actions. 141
With respect to the principle of proportionality as a ground of
administrative review, Lord Donaldson held that the proportion-
ality of a restriction to the legitimate aim pursued should be
considered as a facet of an administrative action's irrationality.
The court held that while proportionality should be considered
as a factor when applying Wednesbury's unreasonableness
test,142 proportionality should not be a separate ground for seek-
ing judicial review. The court maintained that such an indepen-
dent ground would easily lead to courts substituting their view
of what was appropriate for that of the minister. 143 Under
Wednesbury, the Master of the Rolls did not find the Home
Secretary's actions as "falling outside the wide spectrum of ra-
139. Id. at 798 (per Donaldson, M.R.). Lord Justice Gibson agreed on this point, and
added that British courts could not "decide whether an act of the minister, which is
lawfully within the power given by Parliament [in the Broadcasting Act], is a breach of
the obligation of the United Kingdom under the Convention." Id. at 805-06.
140. Id. at 798-99 (per Donaldson, M.R.); id. at 808-09 (per Mc Cowan, L.J.).
141. Id. at 798. See supra note 78. The plaintiffs added, as an additional argument
on appeal, that the Home Secretary's censorship powers under section 29(3) of the
Broadcasting Act must have been directed at a goal for which the Broadcasting Act oth-
erwise provided no remedy. Thus, the journalists' duties under section 4 to assure that
nothing in programming is likely to encourage or incite to crime or to lead to disorder
and to report with due impartiality cannot have been covered by section 29(3). Brind,
[1990] 2 W.L.R. at 799-800 (C.A. 1989) (per Donaldson, M.R.) & 808-09 (per McCowan,
L.J.). See supra note 84. Lord Donaldson found no evidence that Parliament intended
the Broadcasting Act to be interpreted as the plaintiffs argued. Two judges rejected the
argument on the grounds that the restrictions merely required the broadcasters to do
what they "were plainly not prepared to do" pursuant to their section 4 obligations.
Brind, [1990] 2 W.L.R. at 787, 808 (C.A. 1989) (per McCowan, L.J.). However, this rea-
soning assumes precisely what the court refused to consider, namely that the restrictions
were necessary in the interests of national security, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, and for the protection of the rights of others. Cf. id. at 797-99, 805-09 (article 10
has no bearing on the Home Secretary's actions).
142. Id. at 802. Lord Justice McCowan agreed on this point, having considered the
proportionality inquiry to fall under the rubric of "reasonableness." Id. at 809.
143. Id. at 802.
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tional conclusions." 144
IV. THE RESTRICTIONS AND THE CONVENTION
During the debate on the restrictions in the House of Lords,
one member expressed his desire that the restrictions be ex-
amined by a court of law (at Strasbourg if necessary), and that
the status of freedom of expression as a fundamental right in the
United Kingdom be established once and for all.115 While deci-
sions of the European Court are not binding in British domestic
law, the law of that court is the only way to test the compatibil-
ity of the restrictions with the Convention.146 The restrictions,
therefore, merit consideration in light of the case law of the Eu-
ropean Court.
A. The European Court's Case Law
The first test prescribed under article ten is whether a viola-
tion of freedom of expression has occurred. 147 The restrictions
not only impede broadcasters from imparting specific news and
information, but also burden them with a restriction that is ex-
ceedingly difficult to comprehend or implement.148 Specifically,
broadcasters have practically no way of knowing in advance
whether a statement will "support or solicit or invite support"
for the named organizations. 1' 4 Thus, in many instances, broad-
casters must either prerecord and expurgate everything said that
might fall within the support clause or exercise extensive self-
censorship by avoiding such broadcasts altogether.1 50 Addition-
ally, the restrictions impede the British public's right to receive
information and ideas about vital and current events.' 51
144. Id. at 803. Similarly, Lord Justice McCowan was unable to find that the Home
Secretary's political judgment, that the appearance of terrorists on programs increases
their standing and lends them political legitimacy, was one that no reasonable Home
Secretary could hold. Id. at 810.
145. 502 PARL. DEB., H.L. (6th ser.) 687-88 (1988) (statement of Lord Bonham-
Carter).
146. See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
147. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10, § 1. See supra notes
20-32 and accompanying text.
148. See Birt, supra note 10, at 21.
149. No CommENT, supra note 99, at 31.
150. No CoMMENT, supra note 99, at 31.
151. Cf. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) at 40-41 (1979)
(public has a right to be properly informed). While the ability of television broadcasters
to use voice-over techniques to broadcast material otherwise affected by the ban appears
to mitigate the severity of the ban, that option, by definition, is only partially available
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Article ten also requires that a restriction on freedom of ex-
pression be prescribed by law. 15 2 The clarity of the terms of sec-
tion 29(3) of the Broadcasting Act, although seriously disputed
by the plaintiffs in Brind, relate to the question of whether the
Convention is applicable under domestic law, not whether the
restrictions conform to article ten per se.155 The absolute sover-
eignty of Parliament in British law dictates that neither the
BBC and IBA, nor the journalists, can legitimately contest a
statute that has been duly enacted. 154 Furthermore, the licensing
clause of article ten, which endorses the lawful regulation of
broadcasting, virtually creates a presumption in favor of broad-
casting legislation. 155 The restrictions are thus prescribed by
law.15 Notwithstanding this, it is in the subsequent provisions
to radio broadcasters. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind,
C0/1756/88, slip op. at 2 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26,1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases
file). Under the ban, a voice-over allows a television broadcaster to transmit the actual
words spoken if the television image is frozen, or to overdub the extremist's words while
transmitting the actual visual image of the extremist. Id. A radio announcer may only
report words spoken by a banned extremist. Moreover, the government position that
voice-over techniques "might be against the spirit of the ban," endorses self-censorhip by
broadcasters. See The Guardian, Oct. 20, 1988, at 1, col. 3. The reality of the ban is thus
editorial control exercised by governmental edict, and not by journalists.
The court of appeal marvelled at how little the restrictions obstructed the "the oxy-
gen of publicity" to the banned extremists. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home
Dep't ex parte Brind, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 787, 803 (C.A. 1989) (per Donaldson, M.R.). The
argument that the restrictions interfered with communication of ideas and information
was met by the assertion that the networks could continue indirectly to report what an
extremist had said. Id. at 810 (per McCowan, L.J.). However, it is difficult to see how
restrictions which resulted in the banning of the song "Streets of Sorrow" by the musical
group The Pogues can be regarded as lenient. The IBA claimed that the song, which
expresses sympathy for the Birmingham Six, "'indicate[s] a general disagreement with
the way the government responds to, and the courts deal with, the terrorist threat.'
Neither The Pogues nor the Six have expressed support for any of the banned groups."
No CoMMENT, supra note 99, at 65.
152. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10, § 2. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
153. The divisional court found that section 29(3) was unusually wide in its terms
and that the Broadcasting Act conferred upon the Home Secretary a power of censorship
that was neither limited in scope nor subject to the control of Parliament. Brind, CO/
1756/88, slip op. at 8 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26,1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file).
In the court of appeal, Lord Donaldson found that "the words of section 29(3) should
-.. be given their natural meaning[, so that] the power is quite clearly all-embracing."
Brind, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 787, 800 (C.A. 1989) (per Donaldson, M.R.). In a separate opinion
affirming the judgment of the divisional court, Lord Justice McCowan agreed that the
language of section 29(3) was clear and unlimited with respect to article 10. Id. at 806-09.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 72.
155. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10, § 1.
156. However, the Home Secretary's unprecedented use of his censorship powers
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of article ten that the directives violate the right of free
expression.157
The plaintiffs in Brind correctly contended that the Home
Secretary could only exercise his powers in breach of article ten
if a pressing social need existed.1 58 Under the European Court's
case law, the government would have to show that a pressing
social need for the restrictions actually existed. 159 In contrast,
the Brind court's test consisted of whether the Home Secretary
could reasonably have concluded that a pressing social need for
the restrictions was present.6 0 The Brind court refused to ad-
dress the European Court's approach.
The next test prescribed by article ten is that a restriction
be justified by one of the reasons stated therein.161 The court in
Brind stated that there was prima facie evidence supporting the
Home Secretary's conclusions that the restrictions were neces-
sary "in the interests of. . .public safety, the prevention of dis-
order or crime, for the protection . . . of the rights of others."'6 2
The main argument offered by the Home Secretary with respect
under section 29(3) of the Broadcasting Act creates a serious issue as to the ability of the
journalists, and the BBC and IBA, to regulate their conduct under the Broadcasting Act.
502 P A .. DEB., H.L. (6th ser.) 705-06 (1988). Under antecedent statutes, the Home Sec-
retary had used these powers only four times previously, and only one of those directives
is still in force. Id. at 706. Two of the previous directives were issued in 1927, and two
were issued in 1955. The only directive still in force requires the BBC not to broadcast
its own opinion on current affairs or on matters of public policy. Id. One prior directive
required the BBC not to broadcast matters of religious, political or industrial contro-
versy. Another directive required the BBC to refrain from broadcasting statements or
discussions on matters during the fortnight before they were debated in Parliament. The
other directive required the BBC to refrain from broadcasting controversial political
party broadcasts, other than those arranged in agreement with the leading political par-
ties. Id.
157. The divisional court expressly held that the Home Secretary had a duty to
exercise his powers in conformity with the right to freedom of expression under the Con-
vention. See Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 14 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, cases file). Indeed, it would be contrary to the basic principle of applying
statutory limits to statutory powers to assume that the Convention is always irrelevant
when determining questions of ultra vires; it must be considered if a statute impliedly so
requires. See Duffy, supra note 72, at 598. Duffy suggests that legal justification might
sometimes be found for greater use of the Convention by United Kingdom Courts in-
volved in statutory interpretation or judicial review of administrative action. Id. at 599.
158. Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 8-9 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Eng-
gen library, cases file).
159. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
160. See Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 19-20 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989)
(LEXIS, Enggen library, cases fie).
161. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10, § 2.
162. Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 19 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Eng-
gen library, cases file).
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to such contentions was that "the terrorists themselves draw
sustenance and support from having access to radio and televi-
sion."' 6 However, the Parliamentary debates shed little light on
the extent to which public safety and the prevention of disorder
or crime would merit such an intrusion on freedom of
expression."'6
The Parliamentary debates concentrated primarily on other
grounds advanced by the Home Secretary in support of the re-
strictions,6 5 specifically the widespread offense caused to view-
ers throughout the United Kingdom, particularly after a terror-
ist outrage. 6 6 The Brind court refrained from examining
whether evidence regarding the latter grounds existed,167
thereby avoiding the necessity of adjudging the "significant dif-
ference" between article ten of the Convention and the Broad-
casting Act.6 8 The court might have been justified in finding
that the Home Secretary's determination that direct appear-
ances by terrorists on television and radio offend public sensibil-
ities was reasonable, but this finding would not permit restric-
tion on freedom of expression under article ten. 69 Such a finding
would bring both Brind and the Broadcasting Act into further
conflict with the Convention, since article ten does not allow re-
strictions on free expression which protect the public from au-
diovisual offense.
70
163. 138 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 893-94 (1988) (statement of Home Secretary
Hurd).
164. See 139 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1102 (1988) (statement of MP Maclennan)
and 502 PARL. DE., H.L. (6th ser.) 684 (1988) (statement of Lord Bonham-Carter).
165. See, e.g., 139 PARL. DE., H.C. (6th ser.) 1102 (1988) (allegation that the ter-
rorists draw sustenance from their television appearances mentioned, but not discussed)
(statement of MP Maclennan); 139 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1109 (1988) (appearances
on television by terrorists actually hurt them, for example, by subjecting them to rigor-
ous journalistic techniques which humiliate them) (statement of MP Mallon); 502 PARL.
DE., H.L. (6th ser.) 685-86 (1988) (allegation that the terrorists draw sustenance from
their access to television countered by the assertion that a mere eight minutes of air time
was occupied by terrorist appearances during the last year) (statement of Lord Bonham-
Carter); 502 PARL. DE., H.L. (6th ser.) 711-13 (1988) ("precious little evidence" that the
terrorists draw sustenance from direct access to radio and television) (statement of Lord
Prys-Davies).
166. 138 PARL. DE., H.C. (6th ser.) 893-94 (1988) (statement of Home Secretary
Hurd).
167. Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 19 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Eng-
gen library, cases file).
168. Id. at 17.
169. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
170. Cf. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10, § 2 (offensiveness to
public feeling not a permissible restriction on freedom of expression).
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The mere fact that Parliament approved of the Home Sec-
retary's restrictions should not have played such an important
role in the Brind court's finding that the restrictions were neces-
sary for the prevention of disorder or crime."' If the Parliamen-
tary debates had clearly addressed the type of danger that
would occur in the absence of the ban, or if the breadth of the
restrictions with respect to their ends somehow had been justi-
fied, then the debates might be entitled to greater weight. In-
stead, the court articulated little reason why the discussions con-
stituted prima facie evidence of the reasonableness of the Home
Secretary's decision to issue the restrictions.
17 2
The government's alleged compliance with the Convention
in designing the restrictions should consist of more than mere
statements to that effect before Parliament. 1 7 3 An actual demon-
stration of discussion and understanding of the values implicit
in article ten is the least that should be required to show compli-
ance with the Convention. Instead, possible violation of the Con-
vention was mentioned only once in the House of Commons17 4
and twice before the House of Lords.175 The Brind court cannot
rely on the "many and strong views expressed in Parliament" to
support the Home Secretary's conclusion that a pressing social
need for the restrictions existed, since Parliament examined the
restrictions with regard to neither the Convention nor the spirit
of article ten.
B. Proportionality
The restrictions are not proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. The restrictions are overbroad because they direct
171. But ef. Warbrick, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Pre-
vention of Terrorism, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 82, 116-18 (1983) (suggesting that most
counter-terrorist measures employed by a state will fall within the state's margin of ap-
preciation, and that demands for control of terrorism in the context of media communi-
cations are on the rise) [hereinafter Warbrick]. See supra note 89.
172. Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 19-20 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, cases file).
173. See 138 PARL. DE., H.C. (6th ser.) 896 (1988) (statement of Home Secretary
Hurd).
174. 139 PARL. DE., H.C. (6th ser.) 1101 (1988) (statement of MP Maclennan)
(speaker does not question the compatibility of the restrictions with the Convention, but
seeks political, as opposed to legal, justifications for the restrictions).
175. 502 PARL. DE., H.L. (6th ser.) 687 (1988) (statement of Lord Bonham-Carter)
(freedom of expression a fundamental right under the Convention but not clearly so
under British law); 502 PARL. DEB., H.L. (6th ser.) 712 (1988) (statement of Lord Prys-
Davies) (expressing doubt that the restrictions conform to article 10).
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themselves in part to broadcasting that has nothing to do with
Northern Ireland."7 6 In fact, when asked in the House of Com-
mons whether the restrictions applied to appropriate words spo-
ken by a person with no demonstrable connection to the banned
extremists, the Home Secretary replied that such persons would
not be allowed to broadcast under the support clause. 1"7 The
Home Secretary has thus introduced a dangerous weapon that
could be applied to a much wider variety of broadcasting than
may be indicated on the face of the restrictions. Another prob-
lem is that the restrictions deter direct broadcast interviews of
innocent persons. 17 8 Thus, many persons could be prevented
from airing their views due to a remote nexus with a banned
group. 17 Additionally, the excessive side effects of the ban, and
their irrelevance to the Home Secretary's purposes in issuing the
restrictions, illustrate the disproportionality of the restrictions
to the legitimate aim pursued.
The Brind court's refusal to consider the proportionality of
the restrictions to the ends they seek to achieve disregards any
excessive effects the restrictions might have. 80 For example, his-
torical documentary footage of members of listed organizations,
such as Ireland's liberator Eamon de Valera, may no longer be
broadcast.' 8 ' Audience participation programs have also been
drastically affected by the restrictions. These programs are pre-
vented from reflecting the full range of opinion on Irish issues
and must be produced in a fashion that allows immediate cen-
sorship of any dialogue in violation of the ban.18 2 Additionally,
176. 138 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 902 (1988) (statement of Home Secretary
Hurd).
177. 138 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 902 (1988) (statement of Home Secretary
Hurd). See paragraph (b) of the Home Secretary's restrictions supra note 101.
178. Thus, for example, the radio interview of Errol Smalley, who personally had no
connection with any banned organization, was cancelled because his nephew was con-
victed of a pub bombing. Fear of Ban Halts Radio Interview on Pub Bombs, The Inde-
pendent, Nov. 11, 1988 (copy on file in the Brooklyn Journal of International Law li-
brary). See supra note 101.
179. See Nightline, supra note 105, at 4.
180. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind, CO/1756/88,
slip op. at 10 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file).
181. See Birt, supra note 10, at 21; 139 PARtL. DFn., H.C. (6th ser.) 1103 (1988)
(statement of MP Maclennan). The restrictions also negatively affect relationships
among the media and Northern Irish communities: the trust of the local community in
Derry, won by BBC's Radio Foyle as a result of its competent service, has thus been
jeopardized by the restrictions. Birt, supra note 10, at 21.
182. TV ban on Sinn Fein "already breached," The Independent, Oct. 1988, at 2,
cols. 1-2 (copy on file in the Brooklyn Journal of International Law library).
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radio and television broadcasters who are forced to act as self
censors will often err on the side of caution; thus, there is a con-
stant danger of incomplete reporting of events in Northern
Ireland.1
s
Alternatively, the Home Secretary could have designed a se-
ries of restrictions that would have protected free expression and
allowed as little censorship as possible.' A more narrowly
drawn directive would increase the margin of appreciation af-
forded to the restrictions under the European Court's case
law.l85 For example, the Home Secretary could have limited the
scope of the ban to proscribed organizations, so that the restric-
tions would not affect legal parties such as Sinn Fein.186 More-
over, a more precise definition of broadcasting that directly ad-
vances terrorist propaganda could have been drafted to lessen
the substantial self-censorship that has occurred. This would
provide news and information to the British public and the
world that does not reach them under the present restrictions.
C. Objectives of the Council of Europe
The Home Secretary issued the directives with little regard
for the objectives of the Council of Europe.8 7 The objectives of
the Council of Europe,'8 especially the Committee of Ministers'
declaration on Freedom of Expression and Information,'"s illus-
trate the incompatibility of the restrictions with the Convention.
Specifically, these objectives demand the independence of media
from control and the absence of censorship by the State. 90 Fur-
thermore, the unique position of the Council of Europe as an
183. No CoMMENT, supra note 99, at 31, 51-53, 59-65. One of the most embarrassing
indications of the confusion surrounding the restrictions was evidenced by a statement of
the Minister of State on national television that the BBC and IBA should telephone the
Home Office for clearance on any program on Northern Ireland. 139 PARL. DRB., H.C.
(6th ser.) 1086 (1988). One program cleared by the lawyers of a particular channel was
later prohibited by lawyers of the IBA. 139 PARL. Dmn., H.C. (6th ser.) 1140 (1988).
184. Cf. Warbrick, supra note 171, at 99-100 (European Court, in considering the
necessity of a restriction, will consider "the possibility of alternative measures to achieve
the protection of the interest affected and provision of controls upon the means actually
chosen" by a state).
185. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
186. See Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978.
187. Cf. 138 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 893-94 (1988) (statement of Home Secretary
Hurd) (brief conclusory statement that the restrictions conform to the Convention).
188. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
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appropriate forum for development of European media policy
would possess little credibility if it became known as an organi-
zation that fosters censorship.191
The idea of freedom of expression as a prerequisite of a
democratic society, endorsed by the Parliamentary Assembly,
the European Court, and the Committee of Ministers,192 is also
incompatible with the exercise of censorship. Since the Euro-
pean Court would construe the restrictions in article ten nar-
rowly, the Home Secretary's restrictions would be under a
heightened standard of review, and would accordingly stand a
lesser chance of being upheld at Strasbourg.
193
V. THE BRITISH JUDICIARY AND THE WEDNESBURY PRINCIPLE
As a signatory, the United Kingdom undertook to secure the
rights guaranteed by the Convention to its inhabitants. The
plaintiffs in Brind could not have relied directly on article ten as
a basis for their cause of action since the United Kingdom has
not incorporated the Convention into domestic law. However,
since nations that have not incorporated the Convention must
ensure that their law is in conformity with the Convention, per-
sons should have a remedy under domestic law.1
94
Although the Convention has not been incorporated into
national law, the Convention does have some constitutional sig-
nificance in British law. The word of Parliament is no longer
final, and the fact that an individual can seek judicial review of
United Kingdom laws beyond the national court hierarchy is of
191. The European Community (EC) is another appropriate forum for the-develop-
ment of a uniform European media policy. Many aspects of freedom of expression with
respect to broadcasting are encompassed by EC law. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 31 (dis-
cussing broadcasting as regulated under EC law and article 10 of the Convention). The
Parliament of the EC has requested the Commission of the EC to "press for an agree-
ment between the [m]ember [s]tates... under the terms of which... [the Convention]
... would be considered . . . as' [an] integral par[t] of the Treaties establishing the
Comniunities." 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C299) 26 (1977). Furthermore, a joint declara-
tion issued by the official branches of the EC pledged that all member states, as signato-
ries of the Convention, stress the prime importance they attach to the protection of fun,
damental rights, and that they would, in pursuit of the aims of the EC, continue to
respect those rights. 20 O.J. EuR. Cohm. (No. C103) 1 (1977); 1977 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON
HUM. RTs. 832 (joint declaration). Despite these forceful considerations, fundamental
rights can only be invoked if the matter in question comes within EC law. Duffy, supra
note 72, at 614.
192. Bullinger, supra note 23, at 342. See supra notes 20 and 33 and accompanying
text.
193. See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text.
194. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1.
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great constitutional importance.195 Although Parliament has not
incorporated the Convention into domestic law, it is bound by a
negative obligation not to pass any legislation in contravention
of the Convention. 9 ' Despite the absence of a genuine bill of
rights, a de facto bill of rights is being imposed by the European
Court upon the United Kingdom with a breadth and intensity
alien to British law. 197 Nevertheless, the status of the Conven-
tion in British domestic law allows British judges to callously
treat fundamental rights that have not been appealed to the Eu-
ropean Court, thus exposing the basic flaw in the United King-
dom's treatment of the Convention.9 8 The Convention's Fram-
ers did not intend to place sole responsibility for the protection
of the Convention's guarantees upon the European Court.
Rather, it was intended that national remedies be instituted to
secure those guarantees in domestic law. 99
Since there is no bill of rights in the United Kingdom, the
boundaries of the constitutional right to free speech, if such a
right exists at all, must therefore be based on existing common
law principles and the Convention. The Convention arguably
represents an expansion of common law protections of
"residual" freedom of expression. 20 0 Thus, if the law of the
United Kingdom clearly reflects the requirements of the Con-
vention, reference to the European Court's case law becomes su-
perfluous. Otherwise, recourse to the European Court's case law
is necessary to determine whether a provision in the Convention
has been violated.
195. Gilmour, The Sovereignty of Parliament and the European Commission of
Human Rights, 1968 PUB. L. 62, 71.
196. Id. at 72-73. Indeed, "the existence of international obligations [such as the
Convention] place ... a considerable limitation upon the notion of the sovereignty of
Parliament and to a large extent highlight its lack of rapport with modern conditions."
Id.
197. Mann, supra note 65, at 524.
198. See supra notes 65-80 and accompanying text.
199. Lester, Why British Judges Bow to Strasbourg, New Society, July 29, 1982, at
178, col. 3; see Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1. This is illustrated by
the fact that signatories of the Convention are not obligated to recognize the jurisdiction
of the European Court.
200. Cf. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) (judg-
ment of the House of Lords technically reversed due to inadequate protection of freedom
of expression); Regina v. Wells Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Deakin, 1980 A.C.
477 (1979) (per Lord Diplock) (British law of defamation, which stands article 10 on its
head, an intractable subject in need of radical reform). See supra notes 81-90 and ac-
companying text.
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The Brind court relied on Attorney General v. B.B.C.,201
which stated that the Convention and decisions of the European
Court should be considered in cases where domestic law is not
firmly settled.0 2 However, the Brind court failed to conform
fully to these considerations. Although the Brind court inter-
preted the restrictions in light of article ten, no attempt was
made to refer to the case law of the European Court.2 0 3 This
would have clarified the relationship of the restrictions to article
ten by showing what sorts of limitations on freedom of expres-
sion are permissible under the Convention. Since none of the
prior directives served upon the BBC and IBA resembled the
restrictions at issue in Brind, domestic law can hardly be said to
be "firmly settled. '20 4 Rather, the Brind court was faced with a
sweeping prior restraint without precedent in the area of free-
dom of expression.20 5 Furthermore, British courts often cite the
European Court in freedom of expression cases.206 The House of
Lords has intimated that with respect to article ten, the princi-
ple of proportionality has already been adopted in areas of ex-
pression other than broadcasting. 207 Thus, the only logical expla-
201. 1981 A.C. 303 (1980).
202. Id. at 352.
203. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind, C011756/88,
slip op. at 19 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file).
204. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
206. In Attorney Gen. v. Associated Newspapers Group, [1989] 1 W.L.R. 322 (Q.B.
1988), where an application for contempt of court against a newspaper was denied, the
court cited X v. United Kingdom, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981), in support of the
position that mental health review tribunals were not courts within the provisions of the
contempt of court act. In Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers, Ltd. (No.2), 1990 A.C.
109 (Ch. 1988), an interlocutory injunction against a newspaper enjoining publication of
a former secret serviceman's memoirs was dissolved by the trial judge, who cited Lingens
v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 11 (1986), in confirming the need for a pressing
social need in order to justify a restriction. Even in Attorney Gen. v. B.B.C., the Sunday
Times case was cited by Lord Scarman. 1981 A.C. 303, 354, 362 (1980). See supra note
75 and accompanying text.
207. Colman v. General Medical Council, CO/1411/87 (Q.B., Nov. 25, 1988) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, cases file) (per Auld, J.). The fact that the substantive right to freedom
of expression as contained in article 10 was "selectively" subsumed into British domestic
law by all three courts in the Spycatcher cases indicates that British courts could con-
ceivably subsume similar rights with respect to the media, though this is not likely ab-
sent a mandate from the European Court. See Attorney Gen. v. Guardian Newspapers,
Ltd. (No.2), 1990 A.C. 109, 273 (1988) (per Lord Griffiths), id. at 283-84 (1988) (per Lord
Goff); id. at 178-79 (C.A. 1988) (per Donaldson, M.R.), id. at 203 (C.A. 1988) (per Dillon,
L.J.), id. at 218-20 (C.A. 1988) (per Bingham, L.J.); id. at 156-59 (Ch. 1987) (per Scott,
J.) (denying an injunction regarding publication of information obtained in confidence).
More recently, in a decision handed down by the House of Lords shortly after Brind,
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nation for the Brind court ignoring the European Court's case
law is that it would be essentially at odds with the Brind court's
application of British administrative law.20 s
The framework of the British judiciary is ill suited to the
protection of human rights from administrative discretion.
Wednesbury review2°9 has been criticized as preventing review
except in cases where an official has behaved absurdly, or taken
leave of his senses. 21o The Wednesbury standard protects an
otherwise legal administrative action unless it is so unreasonable
that no reasonable authority could ever have come it.211 The
adoption of substantive review 12 where fundamental rights such
as freedom of expression are concerned, as well as the adoption
of a proportionality standard to review the scope of an adminis-
trative decision, are changes that are necessary in British law.
13
Without these changes, the essence of rights guaranteed by the
Convention will be radically reduced.2 14 By considering whether
Lord Templeman indicated that had the government'made the proper allegations, then
application of the proportionality test with regard to freedom of expression would have
been appropriate. Lord Advocate v. The Scotsman, [1989] 3 W.L.R 358, 368 (H.L.).
208. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
210. JowelU & Lester, supra note 93, at 372 (citing Regina v. Secretary of State for
the Env't ex parte Nottinghamshire County Council, [1986] 1 A.C. 240 (per Lord
Scarman)).
211. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
212. Note that, unlike substantive review, Wednesbury review is concerned not with
decisions, but with the decision-making process. Substantive review is concerned with
the substance of administrative decisions. Jowell & Lester, supra note 93, at 369. Exam-
ples of substantively infirm decisions include irrational or arbitrary decisions, decisions
which unjustifiably violate fundamental rights and freedoms, and decisions which are
tainted with fraud and bad faith, and which unjustifiably depart from usual administra-
tive practice. Id. at 374.
213. Jowell & Lester, supra note 93, at 374-76. British courts are already bound to
give effect to the principle of proportionality in cases involving directly effective EC law.
Id. at 376. Thus, proportionality review is not as alien to British law as would seem, and
British courts cannot avoid the proportionality principle on the grounds that it has no
common law precedent. Cf. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service,
1985 A.C. 374 (1984) (leaving open the possibility of introducing proportionality review
into the common law). But cf. Colman v. General Medical Council, CO/1411/87 (Q.B.,
Nov. 25, 1988) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file) (per Auld, J.) (flatly refusing to "im-
port the [obsolete and discredited] . . . European concept of proportionality into the
common law"). The Colman court found that proportionality was best considered as a
subset of reasonableness, considered implicitly in determining whether a decision is "ir-
rational." Id. This seems to be the prevalent opinion among British legal authorities. See
Jowell & Lester, supra note 93, at 369-72.
214. Strict scrutiny, a technique employed in United States constitutional law where
a challenged governmental action affects fundamental rights, has no equivalent in the
United Kingdom, perhaps because there is no Bill of Rights to scrutinize. Cf. L. TRmE,
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a pressing social need for the directives existed, the divisional
court adopted a test prescribed by the Convention, to wit,
whether the restrictions were necessary in a democratic soci-
ety.215 However, the Brind court refused to modify present prin-
ciples of British administrative law, and consequently applied a
standard of review to the restrictions that was more lenient than
would be permissible under the Convention. Notwithstanding
the narrow scope of the Wednesbury standard, the Brind court
unequivocally adhered to that standard and refused to find the
Home Secretary's decision to be one to which no reasonable
Home Secretary could ever have come."'
Since the Brind court concluded that the Home Secretary
acted within the bounds of article ten, the court necessarily
found that he must have taken into account its provisions, which
coincide with his duties under the Broadcasting Act. The court's
reasoning is flawed. By not applying the European Court's test,
the court could hardly have reached any conclusion other than
that the Home Secretary acted reasonably in the Wednesbury
sense. Furthermore, by not applying the European Court's test,
the conclusion that the Home Secretary's actions were lawful
under the Convention has no basis. Given the obligations placed
by the Convention on both the judiciary and the executive
branch, it is simply inconsistent that the Convention should be a
source in 'interpreting legislation but not judicial review of ad-
ministrative action.211
Nonetheless, the divisional court's finding that the limita-
tions in article ten of the Convention acted as a restriction on
the Home Secretary's power seems to carve out an exception to
the court of appeal's holding in Fernandes v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department,215 which held that the Home Secre-
tary was not under any legal obligation to take into account the
provisions of the Convention.21 9 This sort of judicial inconsis-
AhmRicAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1451 (2d ed. 1988) ("strict scrutiny acknowledges that
other political choices [that] burde[n] fundamental rights ... must be subjected to close
analysis in order to preserve substantive values of equality and liberty").
215. Human Rights Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10, § 2.
216. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind, CO/1756/88,
slip op. at 19-20 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file).
217. Jowell & Lester, supra note 93, at 380.
218. 1981 Imm. A.R. 1, 78 I.L.R. 37 (C.A. 1980).
219. Id. In Brind, The court of appeal rejected the divisional court's reasoning and
held that the Home Secretary was under no obligation to consider the Convention. Re-
gina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind, [1990] 2 W.L.R. 787, 798-
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tency is a reflection of the Convention's precarious position in
domestic law and illustrates the need to incorporate it into do-
mestic law.
The Brind court found it useful to compare the duties of
the IBA and BBC to the exceptions in section two of article
ten.220 The comparison may seem wise in that many of the du-
ties of the BBC and IBA coincide with restrictions in article ten.
By allowing the government to dictate the terms of broadcasting
in the United Kingdom, the Brind court glossed over the right to
free expression of which the broadcasters were subsequently de-
prived. "However, it should be for the broadcaster and journalist
to decide, subject to the ordinary law, who may be interviewed
on television, or radio. 2 21 Indeed, a recent report by one of the
most respected legal organizations in the United Kingdom con-
cluded that "the fundamental rule should be that the free ex-
pression of ideas and information is only to be restricted for the
most pressing of reasons, and that restrictions must only be
those that are necessary for those reasons. 222
The court, the government, and Parliament also placed con-
siderable importance on the fact that the restrictions merely
brought the United Kingdom into line with extant restrictions in
the Republic of Ireland.2 3 This is a mistake. While the Conven-
tion is not a part of the domestic law of Ireland,224 a presump-
tion that Irish law is in conformity with the Convention none-
theless exists.225 While the broadcasting ban in Ireland covers
the same parties as the British ban, it has been suggested that
the legislation containing the restrictions is in conflict with the
Irish Constitution . 2 6 Furthermore, although the Irish Supreme
99 (C.A. 1989) (per Donaldson, M.R.); id. at 808-09 (per Mc Cowan, L.J.).
220. Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 15-17 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, cases file).
221. No CoMMENT, supra note 99, at 102.
222. JusTicE: THE BRIrISH SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS,
FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION AND THE LAW 5 (1990) (emphasis deleted).
223. Brind, C0/1756/88, slip op. at 5-6 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Eng-
gen library, cases file); 138 PARL. DEB., H.C., (6th ser.) 896 (1988) (statement of Home
Secretary Hurd).
224. J. CASEY, CONSTITIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 172 (1987) [hereinafter J. CASEY].
225. State v. Walsh, 1981 I.R. 412, 440 (per Henchy, J.) (Ir.S.C.).
226. J. CASEY, supra note 224, at 443. Under a ministerial order made pursuant to
the Irish Broadcasting Authority Act, see supra note 121, any organization banned under
Northern Ireland law is also banned from broadcasting in Ireland. This means that an
Irish minister has sub-delegated his power to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
in that the latter is empowered to decide who may be interviewed on Irish broadcasts.
Id. This may conflict with the Irish Constitution. See IRELAND CONST. art. XV, § 2, cl. 1
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Court has upheld the restrictions, 22 7 they were not challenged by
journalists, but by'a banned Sinn Fein representative, and no
reference was made to either freedom of expression or the Con-
vention.228 The similarity to the Irish restrictions thus hardly
justifies the introduction of restrictions in the United Kingdom.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Regina v. Home Secretary ex parte Brind,229 the divi-
sional court and court of appeal remained true to principles of
British administrative law, which do not take into account the
proportionality of an administrative action to the "mischief it
seeks to avoid. ' 230 In so doing, the divisional court took into con-
sideration the limitations imposed by article ten of the Conven-
tion on the journalists' freedom of expression, but refused to ap-
ply the case law of the European Court, since neither the
Convention nor its case law has been incorporated into domestic
law.
As long as British courts are unwilling to apply the Euro-
pean Court's standards of review and case law, the common
objectives of the Council of Europe, and the protection of free
expression that the Convention seeks to enforce will have no
palpable meaning to the ordinary citizen. To bring about the
necessary changes, British courts must either expand the dimen-
sions of Wednesbury review, or adopt the "proportionality" re-
view utilized by both the European Court and the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Communities. The Home Secretary's order
("[t]he sole and exclusive power of making laws for the state is hereby vested in the
[Parliament]: no other legislative authority has power to make laws for the [s]tate").
227. State (Lynch) v. Cooney & Attorney Gen., 1982 I.R. 337 (Ir. S.C.).
228. See id. passim. Furthermore, to suggest that the restrictions place the United
Kingdom on a par with the Irish Republic is preposterous since electoral support for all
of the extremists there amounts to 2%, whereas 35% of the nationalist community in
Northern Ireland supports Sinn Fein. It is thus not only a legalized political party, but
one which receives "mass support." 139 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 1110-11, 1123-24,
1139 (1988). There were also, at the time of the debates in Parliament, about 60 elected
Sinn Fein councillors in local government in Northern Ireland. 502 PARL. DEB., H.L.
(6th ser.) 712 (1988). At the same time, it was claimed that the restrictions affected Sinn
Fein much more than they affected the UDA, since the UDA had not used the media to
a great extent, nor does the UDA have the electoral support that Sinn Fein has. War
against the IRA, The Independent, Oct. 20, 1988, at 8, col. 6. See supra note 101.
229. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't ex parte Brind, CO/1756/88,
slip op. at 1 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS, Enggen library, cases file), 139 NEw
L.J. 1229 (1989).
230. Cf. Brind, CO/1756/88, slip op. at 9-10 (Q.B. Div'l Ct., May 26, 1989) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, cases file).
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is an unprecedented prior restraint, and is deeply repugnant to
principles of democracy. Although Freedom of the press was not
at issue in Brind, a minimum standard should be applied in ad-
judicating all media restrictions, including those affecting the
press, television, and radio. Adoption of the European Court's
analysis of article ten would ensure that "freedom of expression
in the press and in broadcasting [w]ould not be unwarrantably
fettered."2 "
In order tb achieve these changes, the British Parliament
must incorporate the Convention into domestic law. In the ab-
sence of such legislation, the constitutional guarantees provided
by the Convention will receive inadequate protection under Brit-
ish domestic law, and the European Court will continue to find
the United Kingdom to have violated the Convention.23 2
Rafael Raffaelli III
231. Attorney Gen. v. B.B.C., [1979] 3 W.L.R. 312, 324 (per Denning, M.R.) (C.A.),
aff'd, 1981 A.C. 303 (1980).
232. It is no coincidence that the leading case law of the European Court has in-
volved petitions against the United Kingdom. In fact, the United Kingdom has been
brought to the European Court on 31 occasions since 1950, and has been found to violate
the Convention more than any other signatory. Human Rights Ruling, 85 LAw Soc'Y
GAzErrs, Dec. 7, 1988, at 5.
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